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The Great Lakes Fishery Commission (commission) is a bi-national organization 
established by the United States and Canada through the 1955 Convention on Great Lakes 
Fisheries.  The commission has the responsibility to coordinate fisheries research, control 
sea lampreys, and facilitate implementation of A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of 
Great Lakes Fisheries.  Historical analysis of the commission’s work demonstrates that 
sea lamprey mitigation is a long-term problem for the Great Lakes fishery and control 
will require a steady source of funding indefinitely.  Currently, the commission pursues 
funding through the annual appropriations process of the United States Congress.  This 
form of funding can be unstable from year to year due to changing political and economic 
climates, and is thus, unreliable when addressing environmental issues in the long term.  
To address potential funding insufficiencies, the commission has established a private 
trust fund in recognition that funding, at times, could be inadequate to fully administer its 
control and research programs.  This paper assesses the commission’s private trust fund 
as a secure long-term mechanism of funding suitable for addressing the threat of financial 
insufficiency; examines the commission’s infrastructure, past working history, and 
present status to determine its ability to function, partially or in whole, under a private 
trust fund mechanism; and, assesses the options the commission can adopt to capitalize 



















During the early 20th century, as humans opened the Great Lakes to foreign ships, 
a noxious, aquatic predator slipped in unobserved.  The predator, Petromyzon marinus or 
sea lamprey gained access to the Great Lakes through the Welland Canal.  The lakes 
provided sea lampreys with an endless supply of food and an environment free of 
predators.  The sea lamprey spread throughout the entire Great Lakes system, making the 
lakes their home and ravaging the indigenous fishery populations.  People who fished the 
lakes and depended on a healthy lake environment learned too late that their way of life 
was disappearing.  With the arrival of the sea lamprey, the ecosystem began to change 
forever.  By the 1940s, fish harvests had fallen to nearly zero and tribal and commercial 
fishery operations ground to a halt.  Canada and the United States could only grasp at 
straws as the lamprey did its damage, as no viable method to control the pest existed. 
By the 1950s, Canada and the United States realized that a coordinated response 
to the sea lamprey would be essential if the fishery was to survive and recover.  The 
resulting 1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between the United States of 
America and Canada (Appendix A) created the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
(commission) and imparted it with the mission to develop and implement a sea lamprey 
control program.  The situation demanded a vigilant and sustained effort as sea lampreys 
had become a permanent problem in the Great Lakes.  The commission needed to plan 
for the long-term and deliver a continual program. 
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Nature of invasive species 
In suitable habitat, invasive species reproduce quickly and efficiently.  Invasive 
species are defined by Mills, et al. (1993) as “successfully reproducing organism[s] 
transported by humans into regions where they did not previously exist...”1 and where 
introduction is likely to cause economic or ecological harm, or harm to human health.2  
Variables that increase an invasive species’ ability to thrive in a new environment include 
the ability to survive in unfavorable conditions, high reproductive capability, adaptability 
to new environments, and their ability to disperse rapidly.3  In their native habitats, these 
same species evolve with other species as part of a balanced ecosystem and their 
populations are kept in check through predator and prey relationships, as well as resource 
limitations and spatial differences in habitat.  An example of this natural relationship is 
the Atlantic Ocean, where the sea lamprey are native; there they have natural predators 
which feed on them, and the sea lampreys’ food source is limited to a smaller amount of 
fish within a greater habitat.  Nevertheless, when aquatic and terrestrial species are 
transported to ecosystems outside their established range it results in the disruption of 
native populations and undermines the existing ecosystem structures.  If an invasive 
species spreads, it becomes difficult to manage and nearly impossible to eradicate.4   
In addition to ecosystem health being compromised by invasive species, other 
effects on the region of invasion include harm to the economy (reduced commercial and 
tribal fisheries), to tourism (diminished recreational fisheries) and, human health 
(pathogens and viruses on beaches or through human/animal contact).  The cost of 
invasive species to the economy is exemplified by the Canadian and the United States’ 
efforts to control the zebra mussel - an exotic mollusk that invaded the Great Lakes in the 
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1980s.  By the year 2000, the zebra mussel cost Americans and Canadians a minimum of 
5 billion U.S. dollars in the form of ecological damage and mitigation expenses.5  In the 
case of the zebra mussel, there are no control measures to reduce their populations, only 
efforts to mitigate the damage they cause by clogging industrial intake pipes, fouling 
hulls on ships, and affecting beaches, navigation structures, and harbors.   
Similar to the zebra mussel, the impact of sea lamprey populations in the Great 
Lakes has been devastating.  The difference in the two species is that the lamprey has a 
life-cycle that provides opportunities for population control.  The commission’s sea 
lamprey control program has been successful in controlling lamprey populations; 
however, eradication is impossible because of the lamprey’s prolific spawning capacity in 
the numerous streams throughout the Great Lakes Basin.  Sea lamprey control, and not 
eradication, is currently the only viable course of action financially and ecologically.  For 
the Great Lakes, the goal in suppressing the lamprey is to allow the rehabilitation of the 
fisheries. 
The commission, stewardship, and funding 
The commission’s activities are certainly an example of long-term stewardship; 
its work is and will continue to be integral to Great Lakes fishery management into the 
foreseeable future.  To be successful in its mission, the commission needs to endure 
changes in political climate and evolve with governance philosophies.  More importantly, 
institutions that have been established for the purpose of long-term stewardship must 
have sufficient, reliable funding. 
Currently, the commission is funded by Congress and Parliament through annual 
appropriations.  Annual appropriations, however, are not a stable source of funds over the 
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long-term.  Annual appropriations are vulnerable to changing political and economic 
conditions (such as the relationship between Congress and the president), the extent of 
concern of politicians and citizens, and the general state of government finances.  Long-
term stewardship must continually compete in the budget process with other needs, 
programs, and interest groups.  The degree of funding, therefore, varies with the amount 
of pressure from local and state governments, as well as from elected federal officials.  
The current reliance on annual appropriations for the commission is a short-term solution 
to the long-term problem of addressing invasive species, specifically the sea lamprey.   
 In 1996, recognizing the potential for reduced funding to erode the gains achieved 
with sea lamprey control, and recognizing that budget allocations did not always 
incorporate increases for inflation, the commission established private trust funds in 
Canada and the United States.  The private trust funds allow the commission to accept 
donations to supplement the budget.  The intent of the trust funds has been to hedge 
against budget crises and, then, to be able to deliver a steady or improved level of sea 
lamprey control over the long-term.  Capitalizing the trust funds has been a slow and 
difficult process for the commission, because significant amounts of money are needed to 
create a critical mass of capital that will provide perpetual funding.  Beyond private 
donations, the commission has not established a mechanism to capitalize its private trust 
funds and is, therefore, interested in options to this end. 
 This paper will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of utilizing a private trust 
fund as a long-term funding mechanism for supplementing or replacing the commission’s 
annual appropriations process to fund their sea lamprey control and research programs.  
This paper will also assess various means by which the commission could potentially 
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capitalize its private trust funds and what potential barriers and support could result from 
these actions. 
Though there are a variety of long-term funding mechanisms (see appendix E) 
this paper focuses on private trust funds for a number of reasons.  First, in 1996 the 
commission established a private trust fund to create a stable source of funding to 
supplement any financial shortfall due to the current funding regime.  Second, the private 
trust fund consists of a basic legal structure that establishes well-defined, enforceable 
rules for how and by whom funds can be managed.6  In fact, a private trust fund’s central 
feature is the trust agreement – a written document that dictates the rules of use and 
management of funds, and clarifies legally, the relationship among the various entities 
and actors involved.7  A private trust fund’s legal structure will allow proficient oversight 
and accountability.  Third, the commission would like to assess the potential utility of this 
trust fund, exploring how the trust fund can be utilized by the commission.  Depending 
on the degree of capitalization of the fund, and how it would be capitalized, the 
commission could potentially supplement its current control programs and research, or 
even use the trust fund as an alternative source of funding all together from annual 
appropriations.  Fourth, long-term environmental stewardship is increasingly becoming 
an issue as long-term problems plague natural resources and the environment.  New and 
innovative techniques to perpetually fund the mitigation of key problems are needed if 
regions like the Great Lakes are to have healthy ecosystems. 
This study will also address the reality that a private trust fund could provide, as 
an alternative mechanism of funding, financial and programmatic autonomy from what is 
now an established oversight regime on the part of the federal government.  Therefore, 
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this study analyzes the commission’s accountability mechanisms and discusses the 
impact of a trust fund on continued oversight by the parties to the Convention on Great 
Lakes Fisheries.  The premise of the analysis is that a private trust fund can provide a 
stable source of funding, so that long-term stewardship is possible without compromising 
accountability or oversight of the commission. 
1.1 Outline of Study 
 In section 1.2, this study’s research question and research parameters are defined.  
The subject matter that will help define and answer the research question is outlined and 
criteria are established for evaluating the commission’s capacity of accountability and 
responsibility in using a private trust fund mechanism.  Section 2 takes a historical look at 
the Great Lakes as a resource and its importance to the growth and support of the region, 
both economically and human health perspectives.  This section outlines the region’s 
dependence on natural resources, the historical use of the resources, what has lead to the 
increase in invasive species, and recognizes the impact that invasive species can have on 
the region’s economy.  Section 2 devotes particular attention to the sea lamprey, its 
effects on the region’s ecosystem and economic viability, and why the mitigation 
measures of sea lamprey are essential.   
Section 3 examines the commission as an organization established to mitigate the 
sea lampreys’ negative environmental effects, and explains the commission’s 
accountability structure and how it fulfills the criteria of transparency and responsibility.  
In section 4, the commission’s current funding structure with annual appropriations, is 
recognized as unstable, having the potential to interfere with the long-term programs of 
the commission.  Section 4 also analyzes the perpetual nature of environmental issues and 
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why annual appropriations are not necessarily conducive to dealing with perpetual 
environmental problems.  In section 5 the private trust fund is analyzed for its potential as 
a funding solution for long-term environmental problems.  Section 5 further examines the 
private trust fund as it applies to the commission and whether such a fund will benefit the 
commission’s operations (and thus the Great Lakes resource).  Section 6 discusses some 
of the options the commission can utilize to capitalize its trust fund, assessing the 
appropriateness of each option; the section also examines some of the political and social 
barriers that the commission may encounter with the capitalization of its private trust 
fund and whether or not the private trust fund can feasibly be capitalized and utilized.  In 
conclusion, section 7 presents an analysis of the effectiveness of a private trust fund and 
the feasibility of capitalizing it by both federal means and private means.   
1.2 Methodology 
This research addresses the feasibility of capitalizing and of utilizing a private 
trust fund as a mechanism for sustainable funding for perpetual environmental mitigation 
measures. The research employs previous research and theoretical models of trust fund 
designs developed by the Resources for the Future (RFF), a Washington, D.C. think tank 
which studies the economic policy of environmental issues.  Using their research as a 
guide, this research builds standards that an organization must follow to successfully 
establish a trust fund as a funding mechanism that will fulfill long-term stewardship 
criteria.  Additionally, it looks at the commission’s background, history, and mechanisms 
of establishment and oversight to assess if they meet the criteria established above to 
effectively utilize a trust fund.  And finally, an examination of the annual appropriations 
process, under which the commission is currently funded, to determine if it is suitable for 
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funding long-term environmental stewardship activities and whether or not the 
commission should proceed with the enhancement of its private trust fund for the purpose 
of supplementing or replacing annual appropriations, thus creating a more effective long-
term source of funding.   
Research Methods 
This study was designed to help the commission assess the feasibility and 
appropriateness of funding and utilizing its private trust fund.  The following question 
was designed to help guide the research team throughout the investigative process: 
Should the commission proceed with the capitalization of its private trust fund?  
To answer this question, five sub-questions were developed:   
1. What are the short-falls of using annual appropriations for long-term 
environmental stewardship?   
2. What are the options for capitalizing a private trust fund?   
3. What are the potential political, social, and financial benefits and problems for the 
commission, should their private trust fund be capitalized?  
4. Who in Congress would champion (and who would oppose) an effort to capitalize 
the commission’s trust fund? and,  
5. How would the commission maximize this fund’s use? 
These questions will be addressed in a manner that will allow the commission to 
make an informed decision about the capitalization and use of their private trust fund.   
Major Areas of Study 
There are six major areas of study that will assist in this research.  Investigating 
these areas allowed a systematic analysis of the alternative funding mechanisms available 
in the United States for perpetual environmental problems.  These areas of study are:  
 
1. The importance of the Great Lakes region, resources, and environment to 
the people of the Great Lakes region; 
2. Historical and current work of, and the current funding mechanism of, the 
commission; 
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3. Structure used to ensure financial and programmatic oversight of the 
commission;   
4. Long-term financial mechanisms appropriate for addressing long-term 
problems; 
5. Potential benefits and barriers when applying alternative financial 
mechanisms; and, 
6. How this research can be applied to the commission. 
By examining the importance of the Great Lakes, the commission’s ability and 
charge to protect the lakes, and the dichotomy between the inadequacy of the annual 
appropriations funding mechanism and the requisite long-term environmental 
stewardship, will give a comprehensive background in which to better assess the 
necessity and appropriateness of utilizing a private trust fund.  
After assessing annual appropriations, this study will briefly look at trust funds as 
alternative funding mechanisms.  This study focuses on private trust funds, however, it 
briefly touches on both federal and state trust funds (see appendix E).  During this 
research, the authors designed a mechanism for future studies of other organizations’ use 
of trust funds (see Figure 1, US and Canada Case Study Questions).  This case study 
questionnaire will assist future research in determining the success of trust fund 
utilization and capitalization.  In short, this mechanism will help understand how and 
why trust funds are established, how they are perceived socially and politically, and some 
of the barriers that must be negotiated.   
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Figure 1: US and Canada Case Study Questions 
 
Case Study Questions: 
 What is the trust fund addressing? 
 Is the problem important and coherently defined? 
 To whom is the issue important? 
 Can the problem be solved effectively by the organization? 
 What was the motivation for seeking a trust fund?   
 How does the trust fund operate?  
Is the trust fund public? 
Is the trust fund private? 
Who governs the funds within the trust?  
Who decides where the funding is appropriated? 
 How was the fund capitalized? 
 Was the fund capitalized with one or multiple installments? 
 Why was the fund capitalized one way or the other? 
 Key players 
 Who supported the trust fund and what power did they have? 
o Who pushed for the trust fund politically? 
 Business interests? 
 Agency interests? 
 Private interests? 
o Who supported the fund in Congress and why? 
 Who was against the trust fund and what power did they have? 
o Who was against the trust fund politically? 
 Business interests? 
 Agency interests? 
 Private interests? 
o Who was against the fund in Congress and why? 
 If the trust fund was successfully established: 
 Why did the organization succeed in acquiring the funding? 
 Has the trust fund solved funding problems/issues that existed before the 
fund was established? 
 Has the trust fund enabled the organization to carry out its mandate more 
effectively? 
 If the trust fund was not successfully established, why?  
 
At the inception of this project, the commission asked that a feasibility analysis be 
carried out about the prospects of growing its existing trust fund.  The case study 
questionnaire, therefore, was used to a limited degree, answering only the first four 
questions about the commission’s private trust fund establishment.  Because the 
commission’s trust fund is minimally and privately funded, there is little benefit in asking 
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the questions about capitalization, support, and success of the trust fund.  These questions 
will need to be assessed on a hypothetical basis, and will be addressed in this paper.  
Understanding how an institution with a trust fund remains accountable to 
Congress and applicable government bodies was an essential aspect of this research.  To 
evaluate accountability, the research analysis weighed the accountability principles 
established by Bauer and Probst (2000) in their paper Long Term Stewardship of 
Contaminated Sites.8  In their paper, Bauer and Probst research the effectiveness of a 
range of trust fund mechanisms intended to fund the long-term stewardship and 
involvement in contaminated site cleanup.  This research then assessed whether the 
commission could maintain accountability based on the application of their criteria.  
From Bauer and Probst, four key conditions of accountability were extrapolated:  
• Clear rules, roles, and responsibilities; 
• Public information; 
• Enforceability; and, 
• Permanence. 
 
These four conditions are addressed in section 3 and assess how the commission 
fulfills each condition of accountability.  This will allow further discussion on how the 
commission can function utilizing different funding mechanisms, specifically the private 
trust fund. 
Finally, with an understanding of the appropriations process, trust funds in 
general, and the commission’s specific situation, analysis concludes with an assessment 
of the political potential for the commission to succeed in capitalizing its trust fund.   
The analysis of the political landscape allows speculation into the reasons why a 
Great Lakes legislator might or might not be pre-disposed to support the capitalization of 
a private trust fund for the commission.  This analysis answers the question: Who in 
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Congress would support the commission’s mission to utilize a trust fund to supplement or 




































2 Background of the Great Lakes Resource 
The Great Lakes Basin contains one-fifth of the earth’s supply of fresh, unfrozen, 
surface water.  The lakes have 9,000 miles of shoreline, more than 5,000 tributaries, and 
30,000 islands.9  The five lakes that compose the Great Lakes are Lakes Superior, 
Michigan, Huron, Erie and Ontario.  Four major rivers interconnect the lakes (St. Marys, 
St. Clair, Detroit, and Niagara Rivers) and the St. Lawrence River and seaway link the 
Great Lakes with the Atlantic Ocean.  Great Lakes water has been an essential factor in 
the development of the region, guiding settlement and establishing the economy.   
Economic history of the Great Lakes 
Long before European exploration, Native Americans living in the region used the 
natural water routes to develop transportation and trade networks.  Europeans migrated 
into the region and altered the system by developing canals and channels, and expanding 
the waterways.  By the 20th century, the system contained a seamless pathway for 
transportation, ushering in significant economic development and industrialization. 
The Great Lakes region consists of eight states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), a Canadian province 
(Ontario) and multiple Native American and First Nation tribes.  Today, the Great Lakes 
region’s economy, in both the U.S. and Canada, is heavily dependent on the natural 
resources of the lakes.  The continual flow of material, resources and information makes 
the regional economy an “economic force in the global arena”.10  Indeed, the Great Lakes 
basin represents nearly 11% of total employment and 15% of manufacturing employment 
for the two nations. 
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A major component of the Great Lakes economy is the world-class freshwater 
resource.  Business and holiday travel as well as outdoor recreation account for billions 
of dollars in annual revenue to the region.11  The Great Lakes states attract 40% of foreign 
visitors coming to the U.S,12 and with more than 100,000 square miles of navigable water, 
recreational boating is worth more than $2 billion per year (1992 figures)13 and is 
increasing annually.  The U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce conducted a 
survey in 2001 indicating that an estimated 1.85 million fisherman purchased license to 
fish on the Great Lakes.14 Great Lakes anglers spent (in 2002) $4.5 billion, while 
recreational boaters in the Great Lakes spent more than $2 billion.15 Tourism and 
recreation are threatened by long term negative trends such as climate change, pollution 
and invasive species.  In short, the economic and environmental vitality of the Great 
Lakes depends on the ecological health of the system.   
The impact of invasive species 
The increase in human activity in the Great Lakes region allows the expansion of 
non-native species of animals and plants.  Most notable of these pathways has been 
shipping canals and other shipping activities.  As a major route for goods opened up, so 
did the routes for invasive species.16   
Invasive species are one of the most significant threats to biodiversity.  Their 
success depends on their ability to survive in unfavorable conditions, their ability to adapt 
to new environments, their high reproductive capacity and their wide-spread reproductive 
dispersal capabilities.17   
Once invasive species become established, controlling their spread (if even 
possible) is both technically difficult and expensive.  The concept of eradication of an 
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invasive species, once established, is realistically a fantasy.  Preventing new introductions 
is a priority in the Great Lakes region, with policy makers and stakeholders realizing that 
biological invasions will cost the ecosystem and the citizens of the Great Lakes dearly, 
should prevention fail.   
One of the most destructive of the invasive species – the sea lamprey – made 
opportunistic use of shipping canals, particularly the Welland and Erie Canals.  With the 
construction of these canals sea lampreys passed easily into the Great Lakes.  They 
quickly spread throughout the basin and made the lakes their permanent home.  The sea 
lamprey problem was severe: it altered the Great Lakes ecosystem forever and changed 
the way of life in the region. 
2.1 Sea Lamprey 
Sea lampreys, a particularly aggressive invasive species in the Great Lakes, are a 
parasite in the marine environment.  They attach to fish with a suction cup mouth, file 
through the scales and skin with a sharp, file-like tongue, and feed on the fish’s blood and 
body fluids.  Unlike many of the other aquatic invasive species in the Great Lakes, the 
sea lamprey’s life cycle includes a spawning phase in which they swim up stream (similar 
to that of Pacific salmon) to spawn and die.  During the next phase, called the larval 
stage, the lampreys inhabit the substrate of these streams, filter-feeding for between 3-6 
years, until they transform into the parasitic phase.  The lampreys then move into the 
open waters of the lakes and feed on fish for between 12-18 months before returning to 
spawn.  This life cycle lends the opportunity for the management and control of this 
species population due to the predictability of their location during their lifecycle, and the 
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relative ease of treating or controlling a stream (smaller waterway) rather than an entire 
lake. 
By the 1940s, sea lampreys had devastated the commercial and recreational 
fisheries within the Great Lakes.  Though the sea lamprey was not the first invasive 
species in the Great Lakes, it has been one of the most devastating.  The sea lamprey has 
attacked an important aspect of the Great Lakes economy: the fishery.  As the sea 
lamprey has no natural predators in the Great Lakes, their destruction of native fish went 
unchecked. 
Sea lampreys’ destruction of the Great Lakes fishery is unparalleled.  Each sea 
lamprey can kill up to 40 or more pounds of fish in its lifetime.  Under some conditions, 
only one in seven fish will survive a sea lamprey attack.  The lamprey’s ability to feed on 
any fish in the Great Lakes makes it an especially injurious species, preying on all species 
within the Great Lakes such as catfish, salmon, chubs, lake trout, whitefish, burbot, 
walleye, rainbow trout (steelhead), and even sturgeon.18  Many of these fish are or were 
important not only to the diversity of the lakes’ ecosystem, but to the commercial and 
sport fishery of the region.      
Recognizing the magnitude of the decline in the fishery, Canada and the United 
States agreed to a treaty – the 1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries Between the 
United States of America and Canada (Appendix A) – to address the sea lamprey and 
other problems.  The governments concluded that only an aggressive, coordinated effort 
would save the Great Lakes from complete collapse.  To achieve its goals, the convention 
created the commission to combat and suppress the sea lamprey. 
3 The Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
The Great Lakes economy depends on the Great Lakes’ natural resources to stay 
healthy.  The commission’s major charges are to control sea lamprey populations and 
coordinate and conduct a research program that assists in making the control program 
more effective, and to better understand the Great Lakes resources and fish communities.  
The nature of these charges inherently extends perpetual responsibility for conducting sea 
lamprey control and research operations onto the commission. 
The Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between the United States of America 
and Canada (Convention) established the Great Lakes Fishery Commission in 1955.  The 
Convention was developed to address the decline in productivity of some of the Great 
Lakes fisheries, to advance fishery research, and to prevent further harm to, or 
deterioration of, these fisheries caused by the sea lamprey.19  The Convention recognized 
that there is a need for joint and coordinated efforts by both countries sharing the 
resource as essential to effectively develop control and mitigation programs.  The 
Convention also directs the commission to coordinate and implement effective research, 
conservation, and management programs for the Great Lakes ecosystem.  Article IV of 
the Convention dictates the commission’s major responsibilities as:  
(a) to formulate a research program* or programs designed to determine the need for 
measures to make possible the maximum sustained productivity of any stock of 
fish in the Convention Area which, in the opinion of the commission, is of common 
concern to the fisheries of the United States of America and Canada and to 
determine what  measures are best adapted for such purpose; 
(b) to coordinate research made pursuant to such programs and, if necessary, to 
undertake such research itself, 
                                                 
* Details regarding the research programs and sea lamprey management strategies employed by the GLFC 
are included in Appendix D.  
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(c) to recommend appropriate measures to the Contracting Parties on the basis of the 
findings of such research programs; 
(d) to formulate and implement a comprehensive program for the purpose of 
eradicating or minimizing the sea lamprey populations in the Convention Area; 
and 
(e) to publish or authorize the publications of scientific and other information 
obtained by the Commission in the performance of its duties20 
 
The Convention serves as a legal mechanism, providing guidance and oversight 
by both the governments of the United States and Canada to ensure that the commission 
fulfills it charge in developing and implementing coordinated fisheries management 
programs for the benefit of the Great Lakes region.  The Convention is a bilateral 
agreement that perpetuates collaboration between the two countries to protect and 
enhance the Great Lakes fishery.   
By July 1, 1956 the commission had been organized and assumed its two major 
responsibilities: to develop coordinated programs of research in the Great Lakes and to 
subsequently recommend measures which permit the maximum sustained productivity of 
stocks of fish of common concern; and to formulate and implement a program to 
eradicate or minimize sea lamprey population in the Great Lakes.  
Arguably the commission’s most substantial charge – eradicating or suppressing 
sea lamprey populations – is a long term program, lasting indefinitely.  The commission’s 
Vision Statement on Integrated Management of Sea Lamprey states that the Commission 
will provide an integrated sea lamprey management program that supports the Fish 
Community Objectives for each of the Great Lakes and that is ecologically and 
economically sound and socially acceptable.21  Prior to 1982, the commission’s focus was 
on eradicating sea lampreys, but when it became clear that eradication was not an option 
given the current technology, the commission adopted an integrated-pest-management 
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approach aimed at controlling the population to tolerable levels.  To eradicate the 
population, the commission was primarily applying lampricides in Great Lakes 
tributaries, and the commission determined that it would be a better balance to not 
exterminate, but rather, control the population.22  Although the commission has shifted 
focus from eradication to control, it cannot discard the mandate – if the sea lamprey 
population is not controlled continuously, the Great Lakes ecosystem will never regain its 
health.23 
To administer a perpetual program, a stable long-term source of funding is 
required.  Without funding, it would be impossible for the commission to carry out its 
obligations of long-term stewardship on the Great Lakes.  As with any funding regime, 
especially a long-term funding mechanism, it is essential that the entity spending the 
money have financial and operational transparency and accountability.  After all, no 
government would continuously fund, nor abdicate its oversight over any entity to which 
it continuously funds, were it conducting an inadequate or inefficient program.   
3.1 Policy and Vision: the Guiding Principles 
This section will describe the policies, vision, and oversight mechanisms that 
guide the commission.  These oversight mechanisms contain the major principles under 
which the commission operates.  They were designed to govern the commission, lending 
accountability, credibility, and transparency.   These mechanisms allow the commission 
to achieve the ethical and responsible stewardship necessary to continue as an 
organization that is legitimate in the public and governments’ eyes.  These mechanisms 
are essential in the financial and operational credibility of the commission, lending 
comprehensive oversight.   
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Strategic Vision of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission for the First Decade of the 
New Millennium 
The rules, roles and responsibilities that guide the commission are outlined in the 
Convention and guided by a vision statement in the commission’s Strategic Vision of the 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission for the First Decade of the New Millennium.  The 
Commission’s vision is organized around three broad vision statements.  The statements 
propose milestones to measure progress in achieving the vision.  The three vision 
statements are:24 
1. Healthy Great Lakes Ecosystems 
The commission shall encourage the rehabilitation and conservation of healthy 
aquatic ecosystems in the Great Lakes that provide sustainable benefits to society, 
contain predominately self-regulating fish communities, and support fisheries with 
increasing contributions of naturally reproducing fish.  Conserving biological 
diversity through rehabilitation of native fish populations, species, communities, and 
their habitats has a high priority.25 
2. Integrated Management of Sea Lamprey 
The commission will provide an integrated sea lamprey management program that 
supports the Fish Community Objectives for each of the Great Lakes and that is 
ecologically and economically sound and socially acceptable.26 
3. Institutional/Stakeholder Partnerships 
The commission will encourage the delivery of complementary programs focused on 
healthy Great Lakes ecosystems and integrated management of sea lampreys through 
• Leadership from the Lake Committees in development and pursuit of Fish 
Community Objectives, 
• Coordination of fish management programs, 
• Development of coordinated research programs 
• Recognition of Fish Community Objectives by environmental agencies as these 
agencies implement their programs, and 
• Strengthened and broadened partnerships among fish management agencies, 
environmental agencies, and non-agency stakeholders.27 
The vision is utilized by the commission and its partners to gauge what actions need 
to be taken to enhance the health of the Great Lakes resource.  In short, it is a tool that 
guides the resources that the commission has toward effective management and 
stewardship of the Great Lakes. 
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A Joint Strategic Plan  
The Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries binds both federal governments to 
jointly act for the benefit of the Great Lakes.  Nevertheless, day-to-day fishery 
management is the domain of the eight Great Lakes States, the province of Ontario, and 
the first nation tribes.  With the numerous organizations and agencies involved in Great 
Lakes management, there was a need to better facilitate cooperative fisheries 
management.  Thus, the non-federal entities requested that the commission facilitate and 
implement A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries28 (Appendix 
C).  The participants are all signatories to the Joint Strategic Plan, and it is implemented 
through committees of the commission, in particular the Lake Committees, which are 
considered the “action arms” of the Joint Strategic Plan. 
In a notable example of transparency and cooperation, the Joint Strategic Plan, is 
signed by 14 entities† that are working together to bring consensus to multi-jurisdictional, 
bi-national natural resources issues.  In recognition of stressed natural resources within 
the Great Lakes, The Joint Strategic Plan was initiated to address Great Lakes issues, 
including: 
• Lost Fishing Opportunities 
• Instability of Fish Communities 
o Sea lamprey 
o Over harvest 
o Invasion and introductions 
• Inadequate environmental quality 
o Land uses 
                                                 
† Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Chippewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority, 
Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, Illinois Department of Conservation, Indiana 
Department of Natural Resources, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – National Marine Fisheries Service, 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Ohio Department of Natural Resources, 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
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o Water uses 
o Atmospheric inputs 
• Competition and conflicts among 
o Users of the fishery resources 
o Allocation among jurisdictions 
o Commercial fishing versus sport fishing 
o Native people versus other users 
• Access to the resource 
• Climate change29 
 
Furthermore, The Joint Strategic Plan establishes four strategies for fisheries 
management:30  
• Consensus: The agencies, through the Plan, have agreed that consensus must be 
reached on all management practices that affect multiple jurisdictions prior to 
activities being initiated.  Any changes in management practices must be agreed 
upon by the other agencies; provisions for conflict resolution are contained in the 
Plan. To help achieve consensus, common Fish Community Objectives have been 
developed. 
 
• Accountability: The Plan promotes accountability by calling for the production 
of agency meeting minutes, agency reports concerning each lake’s initiatives, 
Lake Committee reports, and reports of commission activities. 
 
• Information Sharing: Each signatory affirms their commitment to “establishing 
common standards for data access, collection, analysis, and sharing.”31   
 
• Ecosystem Management:  To facilitate an “ecosystem approach” to 
management, the Plan links environmental interests with fishery management.  
The Plan calls upon agencies charged with implementing the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement with fisheries agencies.  “Through ecosystem management, 
agencies agree to actively promote the needs of desired fish communities.”32  
 
The Joint Strategic Plan’s four strategies provide a powerful mechanism that 
ensures cooperation, various levels of oversight and transparency, and creates an 
effective and efficient collaboration dedicated to facilitating Great Lakes ecosystem 
health.  Without the plan, the various state, provincial, tribal, and federal management 
agencies would manage the resource in their own separate ways, resulting in chaos. 
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 Through the Joint Strategic Plan, the commission addresses the complex issues of 
the extensive interconnectedness within the ecosystem as well as the social ramifications 
such as non-native species; toxic chemicals in fish; and non-point pollution sources.  This 
approach broadens the commission’s understanding of the “beneficiaries of management” 
from commercial, subsistence, and recreational fishermen to all other stakeholders 
(potentially all clients in the Great Lakes basin and beyond).  This approach also 
demonstrates the spirit of cooperation, essential for an effective sea lamprey control 
program and a comprehensive research program.   
3.2 Financial Oversight  
Financial oversight of the commission’s appropriations and budget are naturally 
integrated into the structure of the commission through the Convention.  The Convention 
allows for responsible oversight of the commission’s financial credibility and well being; 
it implicitly governs the commission through congressional and executive oversight.  
Congress appropriates funding only after assessing the benefits and efficacy of the 
commission and its importance to the Great Lakes.  Additionally, the commission 
undergoes an independent financial audit annually to ensure accountability and 
transparency.   
3.3 Structure of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission33  
The duties of the commission are specified by the Convention.  Article IX of the 
Convention makes clear that the commission must report to the federal governments to 
account for its activities.  Additionally, the article states that the commission must 
annually submit the discharge of its duties and recommendations or advise to the 
governments about matters relating to the Convention when necessary. 
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Great Lakes Fishery Commission’s oversight structure 
The commission follows a fundamental concept of adopting and advocating an 
ecosystem approach to management and research of the Great Lakes fisheries.  The 
commission’s approach realizes that the Great Lakes region works as a system, with 
interconnectedness between ecosystem components (land, water and air) and the welfare 
of its inhabitants.  All aspects of the ecosystem (e.g., nutrients, fish, habitat, chemical 
contaminants, climate, and human use) interact with each other, and, therefore, must be 
evaluated on their system-level effects.  The commission adheres to a systemic approach 
to decision-making that is consistent with the Great Lakes water Quality Agreement, A 
Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, and the Convention on 
Great Lakes Fisheries Between the United States and Canada.34     
When the governments of Canada and the U.S. created the commission, specific 
mechanisms were developed to ensure accountability of the use of the public money it 
appropriates.  To maintain this accountability, both the commission’s decision-making 
processes and where funding is allocated remain transparent.  The following mechanisms 
ensure that the commission achieves transparency and accountability:   
I. Administrative/Operational Oversight 
a. Guiding Documents: 
i. The Great Lakes Fishery Act 1956 
ii. Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries Between the United States of 
America and Canada 
iii. Strategic Vision of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission for the 
First Decade of the New Millennium 
iv. Joint Strategic Plan 
 
b. Great Lakes Fishery Commission Structure 
i. Commissioners 
ii. Advisors 
iii. Commission appointed Boards 
iv. Provincial, State and tribal Agency-Appointed Committees 
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v. Contract Agents and Partners 
 
c. Information dissemination 
i. Guiding Documents 
ii. Annual reports/Annual Meeting 
iii. Special reports 
iv. Press releases 
v. Presence at regional outdoor shows 
vi. University conference speeches 
vii. Meetings 
viii. Congressional testimony 
ix. Internet website 
 
II. Financial Accountability  
a. Budget 
i. Congressional oversight (Appropriations) 
ii. Parliamentary oversight 




ii. Private firm (Deloitte and Touche) 
iii. Government Accountability Office 
iv. Auditor General of Canada 
 
The above mechanisms are all in place to ensure accountability and credibility.  
Much of the oversight is by the federal government (e.g. the Convention, guiding 
documents, commissioners appointed by executive branch, parliamentary oversight) and 
other oversight mechanisms have evolved as the commission has deemed appropriate 
(e.g. The Strategic Vision, private accounting firm audit, committees).  This combination 
of self-regulation and government oversight ensures finances and operations are 
conducted appropriately, and furthermore, that both finances and operations are 






The Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between Canada and the United States 
established the commission with two sets of advisors from the US and Canada.  The 
Great Lakes Fisheries Act authorized the appointment of the US advisors to the 
commission.  Advisors are appointed from each of the Great Lakes states from a list that 
is provided by the Great Lakes state governors.  The advisors represent and consider the 
interests of the regions’ stakeholders, including the commercial fish industry, state 
agencies, sport fishers, and the public-at-large.  The advisors examine and consider “all 
proposed recommendations, programs, and activities relating to [the lake they 
represent].”35 The US Advisors Terms of Reference further outlines that the US advisors 
shall provide recommendations and/or suggestions pertinent to the commission’s duties, 
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission. 
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The Canadian advisors are co-nominated formally and in writing by the Canadian 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Ontario Minister of Natural Resources, they are 
then submitted for appointment.  Similar to the US advisors, the Canadian advisors 
represent the commercial fishing industry, sports fishing interests, and the public-at-large.  
The Canadian Advisors Terms of Reference also states that the advisors must represent 
the Aboriginal community, academia, and environmental interests. “The role of the 
Canadian advisors is to inform the Canadian Section of the GLFC about the various 
issues before the GLFC.” (Appendix A, Article VI).  The advisors are to assist the 
commission’s Commissioners in making informed decisions about the objectives of the 
commission and related to sea lamprey control and management of Great Lakes fish 
populations.  The advisors also must consider issues that are referred to them by the 
Canadian Commissioners and other matters which are believed to be of importance to the 
Great Lakes fishery, including environmental, biological, or social.  The advisors are one 
component of the commission’s oversight infrastructure – their participation ensures the 
commission’s actions and operations are in the best interest of the fishing industry and 
public.   
Commissioners 
The commission is comprised of four Canadian commissioners and four 
American commissioners (plus one US Alternate Commissioner).  Commissioners are 
executively appointed by the Privy Council of Canada and the President of the United 
States respectively; Canadian Commissioners serve at the Council’s pleasure or two-year 
terms, while the US Commissioners serve six-year terms.  The United States requires, 
and the Canadians ensure, that there is at least one federally employed commissioner on 
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the Board.  The U.S. Commissioners appoint an advisory committee for each of the Great 
Lakes, giving consideration to state agencies with jurisdiction over fisheries, the 
commercial fishing industry, the sport fishing industry, and the public at large.  The 
commissioners are the decision making body, utilizing data, information, and suggestions 
from the advisors and committees; the commissioner’s also serve as a sort of federal 
oversight having been appointed executively. 
Secretariat 
The commission’s secretariat is located and operates its program management 
responsibilities from its home offices in Ann Arbor, Michigan.  The full-time staff 
consists of citizens, academics, researchers and experts from both countries.  Using equal 
contributions from each country, the secretariat staff provides support for the 
commissioners, various fishery and lake committees, scientific research, and sea lamprey 
management and research activities.  Scientific, committee, and administrative costs are 
shared equally between the governments.  The commission’s major work on sea lamprey 
control and research is funded based on the historic lake trout and whitefish value from 
commercial catches as well as the “real apportionment of the Great Lakes between the 
United States and Canada”.36  Therefore, the U.S. funds 69% and Canada 31% of sea 
lamprey control operations.37  Funding from the two governments goes through the 
commission’s secretariat, where its staff (upon consensus based decisions between the 
committees, advisors, and commissioners) manages the funding for all operations, 
control, research, and collaborative activities.  The secretariat works under the guidelines 
of the Convention, the federal government, and independent financial auditing measures. 
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Contract agents and partners 
 Much of the work on fisheries management and sea lamprey control cannot be 
accomplished without effective partnerships.  The commission partners with various 
research institutions to implement fisheries and sea lamprey research.  The commission 
also works with such entities as the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada, and the Army Corps of Engineers to implement actual 
sea lamprey control techniques on the tributaries and lakes within the basin.  These 
partnerships make it possible to perform the commission’s charge comprehensively.  
In 2004, the commission worked with many different entities in the Great Lakes 
region on research, fisheries science, and control programs.  A list of partners that work 
with the commission consists of approximately 40 entities.  This list does not include 
various state, local, federal, and regional organizations that the commission collaborates 
with on a regular basis, such as the International Joint Commission, Great Lakes 
Commission, Great Lakes United and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, among others.  The extent to which the commission fosters partnerships 
and collaboration is testament to the credibility of the organization and effectiveness of 
its operations. 
Funding requirements 
Funding of the commission’s lamprey control and research programs requires 
adequate funding so that lamprey populations do not increase (and ideally decrease) from 
year to year.  This requires the funding to purchase Trifluoromethyl-4-Nitrophenol (TFM, 
the chemical lampricide) and pay for the appropriate organizations to conduct their 
charge of treating streams against sea lamprey populations.  Additionally, the growing 
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research and alternative sea lamprey control program that the commission oversees, 
necessitates adequate funding so that sea lamprey control efforts increase in effectiveness 
and efficiency.   
The financial need of the commission, to sustain regular operations and increase 
the effectiveness of its programs (through research and alternative sea lamprey control) 
follows normal economic trends.  As increased demand for better and more efficient sea 
lamprey control efforts requires that funding keep abreast of inflation, or preferably 
increase so that progressive research can take place.  Without appropriate funding in any 
one year, the commission may not have the resources to accomplish its sea lamprey 
control program; should this occur and control efforts are reduced, sea lamprey 
populations would increase, thereby negatively affecting the Great Lakes fishery and 
ecosystem.   
The funding the commission receives from the United States government, as 
shown in Table 3.1 below, is granted through the congressional annual appropriations 
process.  Within the commission’s secretariat, the legislative liaison, administrative 
officer, executive secretary and in cooperation with senior scientists and sea lamprey 
officers, develop budget summaries annually to account for projected costs of running an 
effective control and science program.  The projected costs are calculated from numerous 
collaborative meetings between the advisors, commissioners, and control agents.  The 
secretariat then informs members of congress about the importance of the Great Lakes 
and the essential operations the commission and its partners conduct to protect them.  
Done on an annual basis, the commission spends a large amount of time securing funding 
for its operations.  As will be discussed at length in section 4 of this paper, the process of 
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annual appropriations is not seen as a suitable perpetual form of funding for the work 
done by the commission, and thus, an alternative funding mechanism, such as the private 
trust fund, has been established. 
Table 3.1. Commission Funding Summary – 1984 through 200338 
 United States Canada Total 
1984 $4,354,000 $2,204,889 $6,558,889 
1985 $4,424,000 $2,194,132 $6,618,132 
1986 $4,730,000 $2,194,874 $6,924,874 
1987 $4,662,000 $2,265,320 $6,927,320 
1988 $4,549,000 $2,251,922 $6,800,922 
1989 $4,549,000 $2,387,502 $6,936,502 
1990 $6,441,000 $3,283,440 $9,724,440 
1991 $6,441,000 $3,302,995 $9,743,995 
1992 $7,780,000 $3,473,084 $11,253,084 
1993 $8,944,000 $3,407,662 $12,351,662 
1994 $10,558,000 $3,439,203 $13,997,203 
1995 $8,803,000 $4,297,427 $13,100,427 
1996 $8,353,000 $4,186,771 $12,539,771 
1997 $8,353,000 $4,287,674 $12,640,674 
1998 $8,353,000 $3,445,287 $11,798,287 
1999 $8,170,328 $4,649,752 $12,820,080 
2000 $9,461,500 $5,089,617 $14,551,117 
2001 $11,733,172 $2,940,571 $14,673,743 
2002 $13,118,000 $3,878,400 $16,996,400 
2003 $12,168,000 $3,869,800 $16,037,800 
The commission’s budget summary: (the outline of funds needed to sustain the 
commission’s efforts).  The funding requirements also support A Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries. 
Measures of success and success to date 
The commission is regularly called upon to justify its expenditures concerning sea 
lamprey management.39  The commission must account for monies spent versus 
effectiveness of the programs it initiates; during the past 50 years, the commission has 
developed mechanisms to assist the measurement of success of its programs.  In appendix 
E, the commission’s programs are discussed in detail; however, the measure of success 
needs to be outlined to ensure the effectiveness of the commission’s actions.  There are a 
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number of mechanisms that measure the successes and failures of the commission’s 
programs and are initiated through both internal and external measures. 
Fish Community Objectives 
 The fish community objectives were developed by each lake committee for each 
lake consisting of members of each country.  The purpose of these objectives is to 
provide a common goal for fisheries management action, and to measure the success and 
relationship between the decrease in measured sea lamprey populations and increase in 
fish populations.  These objectives are reported to the commission and its partners 
annually at the Lake Committee meetings. 
Economic Injury Levels 
To best measure its effectiveness, the commission uses the basic principle in pest 
management, the concept of economic injury level.  Economic injury level is based on 
setting target population levels for a pest species and is defined as “the level of pest 
density which causes economic loss equal to the cost of controlling that pest.”40 This 
measure of a pest species accounts for the trade-off between the costs to control a species 
and the benefits of control.  Costs go beyond financial expenditures including 
environmental costs such as mortality of non-target organisms during treatments and the 
degradation of habitat associated with treatments.41  The commission’s adoption of the 
economic injury level policy has led to the development of a computer-assisted program 
that allocates stream treatments “to kill the maximum number of juvenile sea lampreys 




Control of the St. Marys River 
 The St. Marys River, which separates Sault Ste. Marie, Canada and Sault Ste. 
Marie, MI, connects Lake Superior and Lake Huron.  The river is a wide, deep river and 
harbors prime spawning habitat for sea lamprey.  Because conventional methods of TFM 
treatments do not work in this environment (cost and mechanics of an operation of this 
magnitude would be unfeasible and ineffective) the commission developed a solid, pellet 
form of TFM called granular Bayulcide.  This chemical is disbursed over a wide area of 
the river by helicopter and boat.  The solid chemical reaches the bottom (sea lamprey 
habitat) and releases the chemical at sediment-water interface, thus, killing larval 
lamprey.  This method has proven effective and studies have shown this method to be 
working by reducing spawning efficacy in the St Marys.  The development of this 
innovative control mechanism has been signaled as progress within the program of sea 
lamprey control. 
Development of Alternative Control Technologies 
A measure of the commission’s increased control and science programs is 
evident.  Over the past decade, scientists funded by and working for the commission have 
developed new pheromone studies, a data archival tagging system (see Bergstedt et. al. 
2003),43 genome project that will have a seismic impact on the understanding of sea 
lamprey biology (see Li and Kruger),44 sterile-male-release program, and increased the 
technology of low head, adjustable barriers and electric barrier systems (see appendix E).  
All of these developments have, or will likely, increase the effectiveness and the cost of 
sea lamprey control within the Great Lakes.  Uninterrupted, substantive funding must be 
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kept stable (parallel with inflation), or increase for progressive scientific and control 
efforts to continue. 
Permanence 
The commission has been fortunate enough to be, for all intents and purposes, 
regarded as a permanent institution.  The establishment of the commission in 1955 by the 
Convention of Great Lakes Fisheries stipulates in Article XII that after eight years from 
the establishment of the commission, the parties would jointly review the activities of the 
commission to determine the “desirability of continuing, modifying or terminating”45 the 
convention.  The commission is still here today after 50 years of service to the Great 
Lakes region.  The only other stipulations to terminating the Convention, and thus the 
commission, is in Article XIII, section 3, where it is states that “Either Contracting Party 
may, by giving two years' written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate this 
Convention at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.”46  The 
commission has been effective to a degree that both the U.S. and Canada have deemed 
appropriate and necessary.  The commission has kept its credibility through being 
effective in its mission.  Both the U.S. and Canada continue to fund the commission as 
well as continue to harbor the establishment of federal organizational partnerships with 
the commission.  Great Lakes federal governments of Canada and the United states, all 
eight Great Lakes states, the tribes and first nations of the Great Lakes, and 
environmental and industry organizations and groups all continue to actively partner and 
support the commission due to its effectiveness in Great Lakes ecosystem stewardship.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
The commission is structured in a manner that creates responsibility and 
guidance.  In delivering its program, the commission relies on input and advice from 
boards it appoints, lake committees, citizen advisors, and state, provincial, tribal, and 
federal agency officials.  In particular, the commission formulates its programs based on 
information and advice from their Board of Technical Experts, Great Lakes Fish Habitat 
Conservation Committee, Sea Lamprey Integration Committee, the Lake Committees, 
and the Great Lakes Fish Health Committee.  All of the boards and committees are made 
up of fishery and management experts from research institutions, government 
organizations, academia, and tribal resource agencies.  The commission receives further 
advice from the Committee of Advisors, made up of U.S. and Canadian Citizens.47 
The programmatic and financial aspects of the commission are also well 
documented and under constant oversight.  This oversight ensures that the commission 
works effectively with monies given to it from the federal government.  Section 3 showed 
that the monies given to the commission have, in the past 50 years, proven to be a good 
use of federally allocated money: decreasing sea lamprey populations, while increasing 
fishery populations and, thus, increasing the Great Lakes economy, while at the same 
time contributing to the health of the Great Lakes ecosystem.  The commission uses its 
funding to extend its charge to keeping the Great Lakes healthy in more than just sea 
lamprey population reduction, by advocating for healthy ecosystems, blocking of future 
invasive species, and increasing research around the region.  The above section discusses 
the historical and current work that the commission has accomplished over the past 50 
years, and is currently engaged in, assessing that the commission is indeed an effective 
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organization.  The funding that is required to continue such work, however, will need to 
be long-term, for a decrease in any of the previously mentioned programs will be 
detrimental to the control and mitigation of sea lamprey populations.  A lack of funding 
would also decrease the continued lamprey and fisheries research as well as further 
efforts to keep other invasive species from entering the Great Lakes.
4 Funding and Environmental Issues 
This section clarifies the dichotomy between the instability of annual 
appropriations due to changing political climates and the need for stable funding for 
addressing perpetual environmental problems, such as invasive species.  This section 
begins by analyzing the annual appropriations process, which is the current financial 
mechanism that funds the commission’s sea lamprey control program and scientific 
research to advance lamprey control techniques.  The analysis will address this 
mechanism’s susceptibility to political and economic fluctuations, identifying it as an 
inherently vulnerable source of funding.  The second part of this section will analyze the 
nature of environmental stewardship and the fact that certain environmental issues, like 
invasive species, are long-term problems with the potential to last indefinitely.  Finally, 
this section will explore the discrepancy between the weaknesses of the annual 
appropriations process and the need to address perpetual environmental issues. 
4.1 Annual Appropriations  
The annual allocation is deemed one of the most consequential annual processes 
within the Congress of the United States.48  There are two types of legislation in the 
United States that allow federal monies to be spent: an authorization bill which allocates 
discretionary funding on an annual basis and requires an authorization bill for continued 
funding; and mandatory (direct) programs, which receive funding without additional 
legislation for annual funding (e.g. Social Security).  Like other government agencies and 
programs of its nature, the commission is funded through annual appropriations of 
discretionary funds and, therefore, must follow a two-year budget process to obtain its 
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funding.  Below is an example of discretionary funding process by which organizations 
such as the commission follow.  The schedule for fiscal year 2007 was:      
□ Summer 2005: Agencies submit their FY 2007 proposals to Office of 
Management and Budget ((OMB) part of the office of the president) based on 
broad strategic guidance from OMB in May 2005. 
□ Fall 2005 Agencies negotiate with OMB over their FY 2007 proposals 
□ January 2006 Agencies finalize their requests 
□ February 2006 President releases proposed FY 2007 budget 
□ February-May 2006 Agency officials and others testify at congressional 
budget and oversight hearings; authorizing committees try to write and pass 
authorization bills 
□ Spring 2006 Congress approves its FY 2007 budget resolution (internal 
congressional document written by Budget Committees establishing broad 
spending and revenue targets for the entire budget; contains broad instructions 
for various committees); the FY 2007 budget resolution is unfinished because 
the House and Senate cannot agree on a compromise one. 
□ Various committees receive instructions from the budget resolution to draft 
reconciliation bills (bills that change entitlement programs or tax laws; so 
named because they reconcile differences between current policy and the 
budget resolution.) 
□ Appropriations Committees receive 302(a) allocations (total amount of 
discretionary spending, by functional category, from the budget resolution). 
□ Appropriations Committees determine 302(b) allocations (total discretionary 
spending divided among the individual appropriations bills; these can differ 
between the House and Senate initially, and change constantly.)  (Even 
without a budget resolution, the House can begin drafting and voting on its 11 
appropriations bills. 
□ June-September 2006 Appropriations subcommittees write appropriations 
bills (bills that fund discretionary programs; the only bills that Congress is 
required to pass annually), staying within 302(b) allocations.  Numerous 
adjustments to the President’s budget are made.   The bills are amended and 
then approved by the full Appropriations Committees in each chamber.  Then, 
the bills go to the House or Senate floors and are amended and then approved 
by the full House or Senate. 
□ September 2006 The House and Senate take their separate versions of 
appropriations bills to conference (a committee to resolve differences between 
the House and Senate versions of a bill), give final approval to the conference 
report (compromise bill) and send the bill to the President for his/her signature 
(deadline: September 30; rarely met).  If the President vetoes a bill, then the 
process starts over. 
□ October 1st, 2006 Beginning of fiscal year 2007; discretionary programs must 
have a signed appropriations bill or they must shut down.  To give Congress 
and the President more time, a continuing resolution (temporary 
appropriations bill covering all unsigned appropriations bills, for a limited 
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period of time; also known as a CR) is enacted to allow programs to operate.  
(The last 2006 appropriations bill was signed into law on December 30)‡ 
 The funding cycle itself is very involved, and in the case of the commission 
requires many staff hours to complete, especially due to the process of informing 
congress that the commission’s program is worthy of federal monies sufficient to conduct 
its full programs. 
Discretionary vs. mandatory funding 
The federal budgetary process is complex.  It has many rules, roles, procedures, 
players, and stages that effect how federal money is allocated.  It is made difficult more-
so by its shear size of around $2 trillion annually.49  Of this $2 trillion annually, about a 
quarter, or $500 billion, is considered discretionary money.  The budget’s political 
importance is due to its size as well as a “principal means by which the government 
establishes priorities and defines programs.”50  The $500 billion is subject to annual 
congressional action; it is allocated through thirteen committees and subcommittees.  The 
chairs of these subcommittees are commonly referred to as the Cardinals of Capital Hill, 
in recognition of their authority and power to apportion funds to favored areas or 
activities, and the respect afforded them by members of congress and executive 
officials.51   
The other $1.5 trillion is governed by statutory rules (direct spending), or 
mandatory programs, over which these committees have no control.  Mandatory 
programs are enacted by law, and obligate the federal government to make specified 
mandatory funds available until the law expires based on its provisions, or until 
                                                 
‡ Schedule of annual appropriations process from: Koizumi, Kei.  2006.  A Presentation on the Federal 
Budget for the 2006 WISE Program.  American Association for the Advancement of Science.  Washington, 
DC.  
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subsequent laws terminate the program or reauthorize it.52  Programs under direct 
spending include such programs as Social Security, Medicaid, crop insurance, pensions 
for veterans and other entitlements and interest on the government’s debt; programs 
under mandatory spending are outside of the “Cardinal’s” domain.53  Because funding 
these programs is mandatory, when there is a political push to decrease government 
spending, discretionary programs are all the more susceptible.   In fact, participants in the 
general (discretionary) appropriations budget process, whether a public or private entity, 
government agency or politician, strive to get their program removed from the general 
discretionary budget process so that they need not compete for appropriations every 
year.54 
The political and economic factors which inform the federal budgeting process 
consist of numerous, complex factors.  To measure the impact on the budgetary process, 
and thus annual appropriations, this section will discuss the affects of the economy as 
well as any political considerations that influence the budget.  This is not an attempt to 
dismiss all other factors that affect the budgetary process, but rather to take a relatively 
basic overview of how funds appropriated to organizations, such as the commission, 
suffer from economic and political sensitivities. 
 The commission is provisioned by Congress through discretionary funding of the 
annual appropriations process. It falls under the Committee on Appropriations, the 
Science, State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriations Bill: under the State Department 
account "International Fisheries Commissions."  Annually the commission informs 
congress about the funding required for the commission to conduct its mandate of sea 
lamprey control and research on the Great Lakes.    
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Effects of changing political and economic climates on discretionary funding 
 The funding that is most affected by socially and politically changing climate is 
discretionary funding.  When mandatory programs, or in more extreme cases, the defense 
budget, need money, the entire budget can shift so that the amount of money that would 
normally be allocated to, say, domestic discretionary funds, decreases.  This brings up 
two issues with this funding mechanism: first, much of the government (as well as 
organizations that would be affected by such budget cuts) concentrated solely on 
encouraging the Appropriations process to not decrease their spending due to the 
importance of their programs.  This turns much of the effort that would normally be used 
to run the government, and conduct important work, into an unproductive fight for 
funding; and second, the reduction in overall government funding negatively affects the 
program potential of organizations that rely on federal annual appropriations.  
An example of this comes from talking points from the Heritage Foundation and 
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities concerning George W. Bush’s 2005 budget.  
The Foundation points out that “President Bush’s 2005 budget request takes a first step 
by proposing freezes or near-freezes in most non-defense discretionary programs.  These 
programs, however, represent less than one-fifth of federal spending, and cannot provide 
sufficient savings to close a $500 billion deficit. Entitlement programs, which comprise 
two-thirds of all federal spending and are currently growing 7 percent annually, must also 
be reformed.”55 
An extreme example of a monumental shift in political focus is the change that 
occurred as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  After September 11, 
2001, the budget for homeland security grew to $64 billion in FY 2002, and was 
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increased by another $42.4 billion in FY 2003.56  This demonstrates that a drastic change 
in appropriations for changing political times can affect other sectors in the United States 
government that are essential to its ability to function. 
In an effort to appear fiscally responsible to their constituents, rather than borrow 
additional funds to pay for major funding increases to some annual programs, congress 
often chooses to reduce the funding for other programs.  It is important to note that the 
reductions in other sectors due to re-allocation of typically stable annual appropriations, 
adversely affects the progress and quality of life of citizens.  For example, a decrease in 
infrastructure spending would negatively affect the construction industry, trucking, 
traveling etc; a decrease in funding for the commission, in this case, could lead to the 
reduction of sea lamprey control, an increase in sea lamprey animals and thus a decline in 
the fishery, commercial and recreational fishery, and tourism.  
Partisan effects on annual funding 
There are two potential points in the appropriations process where funding for an 
agency or program can be reduced: 1) the administration refusing funds, and 2) congress 
refusing funds (in the House and/or the Senate).  One example of this was in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2002, when the administration did not allot all of the monies requested by the 
commission to run its full programs.  The commission, as with other agencies around the 
nation, found themselves in similar situations, and there was, thus, an attempt to restore 
funding by attaching a funding request onto the homeland security bill,57 which was well 
funded, and in a good position to be passed by Congress due to a favorable political 
climate, and the perception of the bill to appropriately address the then issues of national 
security. 
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As mentioned previously, it is the goal of recipients in the general discretionary 
budgetary process to be removed from the discretionary funding process so that there is 
no need to compete for annual funding each year.  Special interest in a program can lead 
to earmarked funds, specifically for their program, with a legal framework instituted so as 
to prohibit the allocated money from being spent on anything not related to the program.   
4.2 A discussion of long-term stewardship and perpetual problems 
The term stewardship can be complicated by numerous definitions used by 
numerous sectors in society.  For the purpose of this paper, the term “stewardship” refers 
to the efforts made by the commission to mitigate the negative effects that the invasive 
sea lamprey can inflict (the potential to transform the entire Great Lakes ecosystem) if 
their populations are left unchecked.  The term “long-term” has similar difficulties when 
trying to define it.  This paper defines long-term stewardship as being activities that 
promote the health of an environmental system for at least 75 years, or establishing a 
funding mechanism that will endure for as long as stewardship activities will be needed.   
Most environmental problems in and around the Great Lakes will not go away 
within one generation and thus need to focus on procuring long-term funding.  In this 
paper perpetual funding and long-term funding mean the same thing, as three generations 
would constitute perpetual.  The funding mechanism being studied, a private trust fund, is 
designed to last in perpetuity. 
Therefore, “long-term stewardship” and “long-term funding” are interchangeable 
with “perpetual stewardship” and “perpetual funding,” or more accurately, the ability to 
conduct stewardship, or draw upon funding, for as long as these activities are needed to 
address the sea lamprey problem. 
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Much of this research found that the term “long-term stewardship” was defined 
using terrestrial, nuclear, contaminated sites; most searches and literature on this topic 
referred to the Department of Energy (the Bauer/Probst paper also uses this definition; 
assessing long-term funding mechanisms for DOE nuclear contaminated sites) and 
nuclear sites it is associated with.  Preliminary searches did not expose anything other 
than long-term stewardship in this context, as definitions of long-term stewardship were 
rather narrow in their definitions: “Activities necessary to maintain long-term protection 
of human health and the environment from hazards posed by residual radioactivity and 
chemically hazardous materials.”58  For the purpose of this research, the definition of 
“long-term stewardship” is being extended beyond the narrow definition which uses only 
radioactive or chemically hazardous material.  It can be argued that most environmental 
entities are working on long-term problems within the environment and while other 
environmental concerns such as invasive species may not have a specifically agreed-upon 
life span, they are sure to last many generations while having significant impacts on 
human health and the environment.  
Longevity of long-term stewardship 
The Great Lakes region currently has a plethora of environmental issues that need 
to be addressed on a long-term basis.  Sewage pollution from large cities’ aging sewage 
systems pollute and close many swimming beaches in the region annually; mercury 
contamination bio-accumulates in the aquatic ecosystem (especially fish) in the Great 
Lakes, potentially causing ill-health effects not only in the environment, but to the human 
population who utilize many of the contaminated resources; air and water quality issues 
continue to be of concern within the region; and the focus of this paper, invasive species 
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have damaged the fisheries populations, the overall lake ecosystem, and the commercial 
and recreational fishery.  
Organizations around the Great Lakes that were established for the purpose of 
dealing with environmental problems, such as invasive species, on a long-term basis do 
not have funding structures that can reliably address issues on a perpetual nature.  Few 
environmental organizations acknowledge the long-term nature of their issues from a 
funding standpoint.  In fact, this research found that, although there are some trust funds 
established within the basin, most funding structures look two or three years in advance 
at most, many using the annual appropriations mechanism (either state or federal) or 
through the use of grants (which can dictate direction of research as well as limit 
longevity to, at times, a few years).  These mechanisms are inadequate over the long-
term, and at best, move organizations’ environmental agendas slowly and inconsistently.  
Some may argue that it only takes small amounts of funding annually to slowly clean up 
an environmental “mess” such as a polluted site.  Nevertheless, some environmental 
issues, for example, invasive species, should control measures be inadequately funded for 
even one season, can cause an upward spike in the population, setting back previous 
efforts and causing more environmental harm.   
This aspect sets the commission and the issue of invasive species apart from many 
other environmental issues.  Contamination, for example, will not get worse should a gap 
in annual funding take place, rather, clean-up will slow down, whereas populations of 
lamprey will increase with a decrease, or gap, in annual funding.  It was from this 
background from which this research began; acknowledging that environmental issues 
within the Great Lakes will not be solved in one person’s lifetime, and at times, progress 
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could be reversed should unstable funding occur.  Many problems will be in the Great 
Lakes forever and there need to be mechanisms, both institutional and financial to 
perpetually confront these issues; or there is the potential that the problems will get 
worse, even potentially irreversible, or the entire collapse of the fishery. 
It is the commission’s charge to reduce the population of sea lampreys in hopes of 
restoring the fishery, while doing so in a manner that benefits the Great Lakes ecosystem 
as a whole.  The commission’s management of the sea lamprey’s population will lead to 
the restoration, or partial restoration, of natural conditions (fish populations) that once 
existed in the Great Lakes.  The term “long-term” refers to the perpetual nature of 
invasive species.  As such, the nature of the sea lamprey leads scientists to believe that 
the commission’s mission is sea lamprey population reduction and not eradication.  This 
being said, the commission’s charge is sea lamprey population control indefinitely.   
4.3 Disconnect between perpetual problems and annual appropriations 
This section is a synthesis of the above sections, 4.1 and 4.2, and demonstrates 
that the annual appropriations process limits the ability of organizations dealing with 
perpetual problems to effectively address those problems.  This section will identify the 
US appropriations structure and process as a vulnerable funding mechanism as it pertains 
to long-term stewardship of perpetual environmental problems such as the invasive 
species sea lamprey.   
It is necessary to have continual funding for long-term environmental problems, 
such as the sea lamprey; however, there is a disconnect between current, unstable federal 
appropriations and what is essential to address those environmental problems.  The 
overarching challenge is to establish effective financing and oversight that will endure as 
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long as stewardship activities are needed to mitigate the effects of sea lamprey 
populations.  Because invasive species are permanent, stewardship must be in perpetuity.  
Though institutions do not endure forever, the need for stewardship is a permanent 
feature of Great Lakes management.  Bauer and Probst define permanence to mean an 
institution that can endure for at least 75 years, arguing that this spans three generations, 
greater than an individual’s adult lifetime, and “. . . therefore longer than one’s planning 
horizon for retirement, and long enough to force consideration of one’s grandchildren . . .”59   
Bauer and Probst’s research proposes that establishing an effective trust fund to 
address long-term environmental stewardship and clean-up, needs to take place from 
inception (the planning stages of a trust fund and institution); further asserting the need to 
stipulate permanence within the structure of the trust fund’s formation.  This research 
adopts Bauer and Probst’s reasoning, agreeing that establishing an effective trust requires 
planning at inception, and the need for permanence, to establish effective long-term 
stewardship.   
 Therefore, due to the sensitive nature of invasive species and their potential to 
again wreak havoc on a multi-billion dollar fishery that millions of US and Canadian 
citizens rely on, not to mention part of the US economy, it is suggested that the 
commission have a perpetual source of funding so that the devastation caused by the sea 
lamprey does not happen again. 
4.4 Conclusion  
The Annual Appropriations process is not conducive to long-term stewardship 
activities.  The appropriations process was designed to make monetary contributions on 
an annual basis.  Should there be a funding shortfall during a single year, it creates a 
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stress on organizations and entities that rely on that funding.  For the commission not to 
receive adequate funding, for a single year, could mean that the gains from the sea 
lamprey control program could be lost from its inability to fully complete a control 
regime.  To ensure that this does not happen, there needs to be assurance that sufficient 
annual funding is acquired.  One manner in doing so is to create a perpetual funding 
mechanism that would ensure financial stability.   
The commission is unique in that its charge of lamprey mitigation relies on 
constant and progressive control and research measures to suppress lamprey populations.  
The inherent nature of a live, reproducing population (especially one as prolific as an 
invasive species), needs constant control efforts.  Annual appropriations, because of the 
potential to fluctuate in changing political climates, can lead to uncertain funding 
patterns.   
Long-term stewardship activities will be required for many decades, if not 
hundreds or thousands of years.  Thus, a robust and reliable stewardship system will have 
to endure fluctuating political and economic climates, and will need a sustainable source 
of funding to support that system.  Assuring funding over such long periods is an 
unprecedented and daunting problem, one that calls for innovative solutions, or 
innovative adaptations of familiar solutions.60  In conclusion, invasive species should be a 
recipient of perpetual funding, essential for their effective management.  The current 
funding mechanism of annual appropriations, due to its potential of fluctuation, therefore, 
is insufficient in doing so. 
5 Alternative Mechanisms of Funding 
To address the insufficiency between funding and long-term stewardship, both the 
inadequacy of annual appropriations and the perpetuity of some environmental issues 
must be addressed.  This section describes the private trust fund as a mechanism to bridge 
the discrepancy between perpetual environmental problems and the insufficient funding 
regime of annual appropriations.  In response to the potential failure of the annual 
appropriations funding mechanism concerning long-term stewardship of sea lamprey 
populations and the health of the Great Lakes, this section will identify alternative 
funding mechanisms that address funding stewardship in perpetuity.  Specifically, the 
focus of this section will be on the private trust fund, an underutilized mechanism that has 
already been established by the commission.  The private trust fund will be examined as a 
potential long-term solution to address long-term environmental problems, particularly 
invasive species.   
A continued rate of funding, that does not change annually, is one measure used 
for addressing the disconnect between annual funding and perpetual environmental issues 
in this paper.  The mechanism that best achieves this is a perpetual fund such as the 
private trust fund.   
5.1 The Private Trust Fund 
Though there are various funding mechanisms that could potentially serve as a 
source for perpetual funding, this research focuses on the private trust fund for two major 
reasons: first, the commission asked that a feasibility analysis be carried out regarding the 
prospects of growing the trust fund it had established in 1996 to serve as a supplemental 
or alternative source of long-term funding. This research is attempting to discern if the 
50 
actions by the commission to utilize such a mechanism are appropriate and feasible.  
Second, the private trust fund appears to be the most effective and pertinent mechanism 
for long-term funding of environmental issues available to the commission.   
Structure and function: private trust fund 
A private trust fund is a financial arrangement for managing property, whether 
that property is money, land, or other economic assets (both real and personal property 
under legal terms).61  The nature of a private trust fund is such that the parameters can be 
defined by the trustees and identified beneficiaries.  It is under this pretense that a private 
trust fund is identified as being an appropriate tool for an organization like the 
commission.  As the commission has established an effective operating structure and 
oversight components, the implementation of a trust fund would also be directed by the 
existing parameters and structure under which the commission currently runs. 
Defining a trust  
The rules outlining a long-term funding mechanism like a private trust fund and 
the roles and responsibilities of each party involved must be explicit.  These criteria 
ensure that the program is transparent and operates effectively.  Literature provides some 
guidance about how transparency and accountability can be ensured.  In particular, Bauer 
and Probst (2000) describe how accountability and transparency are heightened when 
organizations have a written and legally binding agreement, signed by all involved 
parties, that delineates what activities must be undertaken and when.  The commission’s 
connection, structure, public participation processes, and financial accountability 
practices (described in section 3) satisfy the criteria established by Bauer and Probst.  The 
trust funds established by the commission also follow these criteria, and have been 
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developed to adhere to the already established oversight criteria in the convention, as well 
as the criteria outlined in section 1. 
A trust fund refers to the vesting of income or property in perpetuity for charitable 
purposes. The definition of charitable purpose is broad enough to cover activities other 
than direct relief of distress due to poverty or calamities. It includes education, medical 
relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility such as 
promotion and preservation of the arts.  This definition is appropriate for addressing 
environmental issues, as they too are for general public utility, especially a resource such 
as the Great Lakes, which can be considered one of the ultimate public “utilities” 
providing clean water, recreational and commercial fishing, transportation, and overall 
vitality to the millions of residence of the Great Lakes region, and the U.S. and Canada. 
Enforceability of a trust 
Without a system that enforces compliance, there will be little confidence in the 
trustee.  Lacking confidence, the trustee loses credibility that a trust can perform its 
mission or manage funds well.62  Enforceability ensures that the trust fund is implemented 
using oversight guidelines for a well managed fund and the criteria that are met by these 
guidelines include the roles, responsibility, and transparency of the trustee.  A trust’s 
guidelines should include not only operational direction, but financial oversight to ensure 
that the trustee does not mismanage funds.  Essential to the effective functionality of a 
trust fund is that the “enforceability” criteria are in place when creating a trust fund, and 
that all participants are aware or involved in its development and oversight. 
52 
Other trust fund options 
Two additional long-term funding mechanisms were briefly compared against 
each other and the private trust fund during this research: the state, and the federal trust 
fund.  Under different circumstances, the federal and state trust funds prove valuable, but 
do not meet the criteria essential for operating the commission in a sustainable manner, 
nor for purposes of long-term funding.  In short, these alternative funds: a) do not fulfill 
the criteria for providing long-term, secure funding for environmental issues; and, b) 
deserve further research, but will not be given further treatment in this paper.  The 
analysis of state and federal trust funds conducted for this study can be found in 
Appendix E. 
5.2 The structure of the commission’s private trust fund 
The central feature of a private trust fund, and one that ensures transparency, 
guidance, and enforceability is a written document that spells out the rules for the use and 
management of property and clarifies the relationship among different actors and 
organizations.63  Clarification is essential, and a major challenge.  The above description 
defines the criteria for a lawful and effective trust fund – this subsection, addresses 
whether or not the commission fulfills those criteria within its own trust fund structure. 
Effects on the commissions’s structure upon changing the funding mechanism 
What are the potential changes that could take place should the structure of the 
commission’s funding change from that of annual appropriations, to that of a private trust 
fund mechanism?  The purpose of this section is to assess whether a private trust fund 
would alter (negatively or positively) the efficacy of the commission in doing its job of 
suppressing sea lampreys and overseeing an effective research program.      
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When the commission established its private trust fund, the goal was to develop a 
supplemental source of funding for their perpetual mission. According to the 
commission, “The purpose of the [trust fund] is to provide enhanced support for sea 
lamprey management and fishery research programs, the same reasons for which the 
Commission was formed.  The [trust fund] enable[s] interested parties to make tax 
deductible contributions in accordance with tax regulations in each country.”64   
For the purpose of the commission’s funding structure, it is possible to separate 
the funding mechanism from the operations of the commission.  In other words, changing 
the funding mechanism, in theory, from annual appropriations to a trust fund, only 
changes the source of funding and not the commission’s operations or function.  The 
structure will continue to be in place and will continue to be monitored by already 
existing oversight measures to ensure effective and efficient management.  Mechanisms 
of oversight, which have been addressed in this paper, include executive oversight 
through the commissioners (appointed by the President and Parliament), the Convention, 
and internal and external audits (both financial as well as operational).  The commission’s 
private trust fund was established using the existing oversight and management 
parameters by which the commission currently follows; therefore oversight would 
continue as it has in the past.  Specifically, the parameters of the trust fund, as outlined in 
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission Trust Fund agreement: 
Identical to the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, the purposes of the Trust activities 
are:  
 
a) To formulate a research program or programs designed to determine the need for 
measures to make possible the maximum sustained productivity of any stock of fish 
in the Convention Area which, in the opinion of the Commission, is of common 
concern to the fisheries of the United States of America and Canada and to determine 
what measures are best adapted for such purposes; 
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b) To coordinate research made pursuant to such programs and, if necessary, to 
undertake such research itself; 
c) To recommend appropriate measures to the Contracting Parties on the basis of the 
findings of such research programs; 
d) To formulate and implement a comprehensive program for the purpose of eradicating 
or minimizing the sea lamprey populations in the Convention Area; and 
e) To publish or authorize the publication of scientific and other information obtained by 
the Commission in the performance of its duties.§ 
Oversight will remain constant under this new funding mechanism. 
The commission’s private trust fund, as in any trust, is defined by a trust deed.  In 
the case of the commission, the trust deed uses the exact wording from the Convention on 
Great Lakes Fisheries Between the United States and Canada, Article IV.  This article 
outlines the commission’s charge and in the case of the trust fund, how the trust fund will 
be executed, which is to say, under the same oversight of the current parameters under 
which the commission currently functions.  Therefore, any money that is accrued in the 
commission’s private trust fund will be used exactly as if it were given to the commission 
through annual appropriations, and monies in the trust fund will have the same oversight.  
The commission would run as it has in the past, using the funding from the trust fund to 
conduct its mission under the Convention, vision, commissioners and usual protocol and 
guidelines. 
During the previous 50 years, the commission has accomplished financial 
credibility by keeping all records and actions transparent through various means such as 
publishing all spending, activities, and research annually.  All financial decisions go 
through the executively appointed commissioners (both Canadian and US); a majority 
(90%) of funding goes to the commission’s mission of sea lamprey suppression and the 
                                                 
§ This is from the Great Lakes Fishery Commission Trust Fund document, created to lawfully guide the 
commission’s trust fund monies.  This excerpt is also from the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries 
Between the United States of America and Canada (see appendix A).  
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rest generally goes to program management, support of the Joint Strategic Plan, and to 
scientific study for future, more efficient suppression methods for mitigating sea lamprey 
populations.   
Another important aspect of maintaining a private trust fund is to have a 
successful mission statement that is not only transparent to the initial funding 
organization, but also to its benefactors.  In this case, the commission is the trustee, the 
US and Canadian governments are the funding organizations, and the citizens of the 
Great Lakes region are the benefactors. The nature of a private trust fund, established by 
law is such that the commission would be the trustee, therefore, mandating responsibility 
of all funding given to the commission.  One concern that critics have about trust funds is 
the issue of accountability and responsibility of the fund’s trustee.  Clarity is essential to 
ensuring that the program being funded is transparent, efficient, and effective.  As the 
commission has been working effectively under guidelines mandated by convention for a 
half century, it is logical for them to outline their strategy and where the funding will be 
utilized.  It appears that the commission has no intention of changing their financial 
distribution structure, as evidenced by their private trust fund legally following the same 
rules established by the Convention.  In short, the funding mechanism could change, but 
the structure and function will continue. 
Potential legal barriers in capitalizing a private trust fund from federal sources 
Further analysis into the feasibility of congressional support of a private trust fund 
led to previous studies on this subject.  In particular, Bauer and Probst address the 
potential legality of funding a private trust fund using federal sources and they voice a 
strong opinion that long-term funding mechanisms are appropriate for addressing long-
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term stewardship of natural resource issues.  During their study, they ask that further 
investigation of whether or not the federal government has the “legal authority to finance 
. . . private-charitable trust funds, in this case, for financing and oversight of long-term 
stewardship.”65  This led to a similar question; reassessing the original research question 
from “How can the commission capitalize its trust fund through federal funds?” to “Can 
the commission capitalize its trust fund through federal funds?”  Their conclusion to the 
above concern is that if the federal government does not have such authority, that it 
should be obtained, as they believe that private trust funds are beneficial to the long-term 
stewardship of the environment and natural resources.  Again, the scope of this study 
does not address the legality of the federal government’s ability to capitalize a private 
trust fund; however, this paper will address the potential ramification assuming it is legal.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This section demonstrated that a private trust fund meets the criteria for creating a 
long-term, clearly structured, enforceable and permanent funding mechanism to address 
perpetual environmental stewardship, as defined by the commission, to address invasive 
species and ecosystem management on the Great Lakes.  It further demonstrated that the 
commission’s private trust fund has been established in accordance with these criteria, 
meeting the standards suitable and appropriate for creating a sustainable long-term 
funding mechanism. 
6 Option and recommendations 
  This research has characterized the private trust fund as an effective long-term 
funding mechanism appropriate for addressing long-term environmental stewardship.  
Further, this research has demonstrated that the performance of a trust fund will be 
dependent on how that specific trust is structured and through what appropriate legal 
guidelines it will become a responsible and enforceable funding mechanism.  The 
commission, from its inception, has been under the direction of such legal guidelines, 
directing its operations and serving as oversight for effective control and responsible 
financial operations.  These guidelines, in the form of the Convention, constitute the 
guiding principles that the commission must follow.  The private trust fund that the 
commission developed in 1996 also follows the guidelines of the Convention and, thus, 
follows the necessary structure outlined in this document to serve as an effective and 
responsible funding mechanism.  Therefore, it has been established that the commission 
under its current operational and financial guidelines, when both utilizing its current 
funding regime (annual appropriations), and for its potential utilization of its established 
private trust fund, needs only to assess how to capitalize their trust fund and to what 
effect capitalizing that fund might have on their operations and political relationships. 
Two questions logically arise from the realization that a private trust fund is a 
useful and beneficial mechanism, and both must be answered by the commission prior to 
embarking on a mission of capitalizing its trust funds, they are: 
1. How does one capitalize the trust fund to a degree that annual interest accrued 
equals that which the Great Lakes Fishery Commission can utilize to practically 
supplement or run, partially or in full, its control and/or research programs? 
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2. Would the capitalization of the private trust fund create a break in funding flow 
that would inhibit the commission’s ability to control lamprey at any point?  
These two questions will be addressed in sections 6.1 and 6.2 respectively, 
identifying future research essential to the commission’s efforts in capitalizing their 
private trust fund.  It must be noted here, and will be reiterated, that any action taken to 
establish capital into the commission’s trust fund, must be initiated with a serious study 
of how capitalization of their trust fund will affect the funding relationship with the 
federal government, and whether or not there could be adverse ramifications or benefits 
concerning funding of the commission.  It is the intention of the next two sections to 
identify a variety of potential fund raising mechanisms the commission can use, the 
advantages and disadvantages of using each mechanism, and the crucial question of how 
a capitalized trust fund might effect the relationship between the commission and 
congress.  
6.1 Potential sources for capitalizing the commission’s private trust fund 
Thus far, the research in this paper has concluded that the private trust fund is a 
long-term funding mechanism suitable for the commission to utilize to run its programs. 
It will now assess the potential options the commission can take to begin capitalizing the 
trust fund.  Here, we refer to the question: How does one capitalize the trust fund to a 
degree that annual interest accrued equals that which the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission requires to run, partially or in full, its control and/or research programs?  
Capitalizing the commission’s private trust fund can be done in a variety of ways, from 
private sources (individual citizens or companies) to federal funding (contingent on the 
legality of federal monies being allocated into a private trust fund).  The below 
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suggestions are not in any specific order and all will need to be further assessed for their 
practicality and appropriateness under the current, and if possible, future political, 
economic, and social climates within the Great Lakes region as well as at the federal 
level. 
Each option below consist of a myriad of legal, political, and/or logistical 
complexities, and therefore each option deserves its own dedicated research, beyond the 
scope of this paper, to fully assess its feasibility and appropriateness for use by the 
commission. 
 One manner in which the commission could capitalize its private trust fund could be 
to set aside a certain percentage of their environmental program costs (from their 
annual appropriations allocation) each year and invest that into their trust fund.66 The 
rate at which the fund is capitalized is wholly dependant on the commission’s ability 
to invest a part of its annual appropriations, while still conducting an effective control 
and research program.  Nevertheless, the conflict immediately arises that the 
commission initially created their trust fund due to congressional appropriations not 
meeting inflation, or being insufficient due to the political climate.  In short, the 
commission’s current funding regime has been insufficient to implement their full 
control and research programs, and therefore, will likely not have enough extra 
funding to invest into the trust fund without affecting the commission’s programs.  
Although, in the long-term, slowly capitalizing the trust fund would be beneficial, it 
would need to be assessed by the commission, if every year, capital could be taken 
out of their already insufficient funding regime, thus potentially hurting the resource 
further by not allowing the commission to conduct its full control and research 
program.   
 
 Another option for capitalizing the commission’s private trust fund would be to 
accept private donations.  This option may be the easiest of all of the options in this 
section, and is currently practiced by the commission.  The amount of money 
annually collected through this means, however, to date has been inadequate, and 
does not amass enough interest to make a practical difference in supplementing the 
control operations or research program of the commission during a financial 
shortfall.**  On a small scale, this practice of donation has not been questioned, 
however, should the commission actively seek larger contributions, a question of 
responsibility could emerge.  Because the sea lamprey was introduced into the Great 
                                                 
** Currently, companies and friends of the GLFC have contributed small amounts of money into the GLFC 
account, more as a gesture of contribution to the health of the Great Lakes ecosystem as a whole.  These 
monies, currently total $146,405 from donations between 1996 to the present and are practically 
insufficient to support the commission’s operations in part or in full. 
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Lakes by federally mandated and funded canals, and the federal governments of the 
United States and Canada have agreed to fund the mitigation of sea lamprey 
populations (through the Convention), any solicitation on the part of the commission 
to capitalize the private trust fund could potentially be met with disagreement from 
other entities within the Great Lakes (e.g. commercial and recreational fisherman, 
tribes, shipping, public, etc).  This tends to be a problem of perception and a question 
of whose responsibility it truly is to fund the mitigation of sea lamprey.  Though it 
would benefit all stakeholders were they to contribute to the fund, precedence has 
already been set with the federal government funding the commission for the past 50 
years.  As the Great Lakes waters are divided into state, provincial, tribal and local 
waters, it would be difficult to find a stakeholder willing to “pay” for the stewardship 
of others, especially in a resource of common use.  The potential for the free-rider to 
piggy back on other’s willingness to help would be pervasive.  As the Convention has 
outlined that there are federal monies available to address the problem of fisheries 
decline due to sea lamprey control, other stakeholders may not feel it is their duty to 
contribute.  In short, an active campaign within the Great Lakes region to accrue 
monies to fill the commission’s private trust fund would need to be done carefully, 
possibly framed in a manner that espouses future research, rather than control. 
 
 The commission can attempt to fundraise through various means (selling items, 
holding fund raisers).  This option has the same problems as option 2; attempts by the 
commission to accrue money from the citizens of the Great Lakes could look 
politically inappropriate, as the federal government is already funding the 
commission.  Attempts to bolster funding would again have to be framed carefully, in 
terms of research growth, or a more difficult approach, describing the inadequate 
annual funding regime of annual appropriations, and how the commission needs to 
supplement their under funded programs.  An additional problem that could arise is 
the funds required and the energy (e.g. staff time) it would take to implement such a 
program.  The commission would need to assess if the trade off of staff time 
dedicated to capitalizing their private trust fund would out-weigh current efforts to 
encourage the federal government to adequately fund the commission annually.  
 
 The commission could attempt to encourage the federal government to allocate a one 
time, large sum, to the commission’s private trust fund.  Should the appropriate 
amount of money be allocated (e.g. an appropriate allocation would have to be 
sufficient to accrue interest in the amount that would fully fund the commission 
annually).  This amount of money would ensure that, at a suitable interest rate, the 
commission will be able to perform its annual duties in perpetuity and without further 
annual federal funding.††  This option could capitalize the trust fund to a point that 
would adequately fund the commission’s programs annually. 
 
 Congress can provide a budget authority over multiple years, providing outlays as it 
deems appropriate.  The governments could capitalize the commission trust fund over 
2 or more years that will eventually fill the commission’s private trust fund so that it 
                                                 
†† The option has been discussed by Bauer and Probst as a suitable; however, the legality of this option is 
not clear. 
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can accrue interest to the level that it can perform its annual duties in perpetuity and 
without further annual federal funding.  This option would require the commission be 
funded appropriately while the trust fund accrued the appropriate interest.  Or that the 
federal government would need to over fund the commission, ensuring it had enough 
money for its operations as well as a substantial amount to fill the trust fund. 
 
 An option that is already used for state trust funds is the use of stamps and stickers on 
boating or hunting license and Great Lakes fisheries use.  This option needs further 
investigation as a potential alternative.  It appears that this funding process would be 
difficult on a state level, as money accrued by one state could be viewed, by the state 
sponsoring the stamp, as unfairly contributing to a already federally funded program. 
Any of the above funding solutions can be used to partially fill the commission’s 
trust fund so that the fund will be able to supplement operations or research rather than 
replacing annual appropriations altogether.  The above suggestions for capitalizing the 
commission’s private trust fund were developed from informal interviews and 
discussions with commission staff and upon looking at trust fund literature and fund 
raising literature; it is not an exhaustive list of funding options.  Each suggestion has 
potential problems as well as its benefits.  For example, the first suggestion is that the 
commission could embark upon its own fund raising campaign.  Though this is a viable 
option it has several setbacks: 
 Dedicated or increased staff, staff time, and/or staff energy.  This would be taken 
away from staff time that is currently utilized for the purposes of maintaining an 
invasive species mitigation program and research program.   
 Would fund raising activities be allowed under the guidelines of the commission? 
 Small gains vs. large efforts.  Though we have not investigated all potential funding 
options, it is assumed that merchandise would be one of them.  The market for these 
would likely bring in minimal dollars.  The commission has invested in the 
development of a fresh water “pop-off” archival fish tag with a private sector 
company.  If this technology is developed successfully, it could generate considerable 
revenue for the commission’s trust fund.67 
 Outsourcing talent and production.  Should the staff of the organization not have the 
appropriate talent to design marketable merchandise, the commission would likely 
have someone design it; furthermore, merchandise would have to be made by other 
organizations.  In addition to costing money, time and energy, the gains (as 
mentioned above) would be minimal for trying to supplement a trust fund to a degree 
that it would be practical. 
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 Social and political views.  The commission is a federally funded entity.  There could 
be a negative social perception that the commission was trying to get more than it 
deserves from the community (as tax dollars fund the commission).  This perception, 
whether real or not could be detrimental to the commission’s efforts. 
 Legality.  Is the commission allowed to “profit” from sales of merchandise or other 
fundraising activities?  Are there local, state, federal laws that need to be addressed? 
The ability to initiate the above options will depend on the resources (financial 
and personnel) available to the commission in any one year.  Efforts will range from 
managing a fund raising campaign (whether it is merchandise oriented or not), lobbying 
for special stamps on licenses, or initiating congress in a discussion on their willingness 
to appropriate large sums of money into the commission’s trust fund.  A larger issue 
arises, however, with the capitalization of the commission’s trust funds, and that is one of 
financial independence from congress.  Earlier it was mentioned that Congress does not 
like to lose the power of the purse.  It is thus the interest of the commission to assess 
whether they see the federal government and other stakeholders becoming threatened by 
the commission’s perceived or real financial independence from the appropriation’s 
committees.   
6.2 How will capitalization of the private trust fund effect the “normal” 
funding structure of the commission? 
Making long-term funding and stewardship commitments can be a highly political 
issue, typically inviting strong opposition and conflict, as interest groups that currently 
have political influence try to institutionalize it.68  The process by which the commission 
engages in the establishment of an independent, long-term source of funding, could 
potentially create an atmosphere of unease between the commission and congress.  The 
conflict would likely stem from congress’ influence over funding, or the “power of the 
purse,” becoming drastically diminished should the commission gain financial 
independence or strength through the capitalization of their trust fund.  This relationship 
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between the commission and the federal government’s appropriation’s committees is a 
subject that this section will cover, and will be guided with the crucial question: “Would 
the capitalization of the private trust fund create a break in funding flow that would 
inhibit the commission’s ability to control lamprey at any point?”  It is important to 
realize that, should the commission begin to, or succeed in, funding their private trust 
fund, congress may view this as a threat of losing their power of funding over the 
commission.  Whether this is a real or perceived threat, actions taken by Congress could 
include reducing the appropriations annually to the commission.  Should the 
commission’s trust fund not be capitalized sufficiently, then its ability to supplement, or 
cover the costs, should Congress cut funding to any degree, may be inadequate, thus 
threatening, or greatly reducing, the ability to conduct its research and control programs 
(e.g. the trust fund would be unable to produce enough in interest to cover operational 
costs, or to meet the shortfall of the governments cuts).  The amount to which the 
commission can fill its trust fund to use as supplemental funding of the commission’s 
programs, while still receiving annual appropriations, needs to be calculated so that at no 
time does federal funding decrease or become unavailable and thus threaten the 
commission’s program.  Therefore, this section will address some potential reactions of 
congress concerning the theoretical capitalization of the commission’s trust fund and 
assess whether it is feasible to increase the long-term funding proficiency of the 
commission through the capitalization of their trust fund (and thus creating a better, more 
effective long-term funding mechanism), without threatening its ability to execute its 
control, program management, and research programs.  
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Potential political reactions to a capitalized private trust fund 
To understand the reaction of congress towards a financially independent Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission, it is necessary to briefly revisit the political process under 
which discretionary funding operates, the power that Congress has, and what that power 
means, and the ramifications of the independence on said power. 
Dick Munson, Executive Director of the Northeast-Midwest Institute and author 
of The Cardinals of Capitol Hill, assessed that the appropriations committee would not be 
amenable to having the commission capitalize their trust fund, as congress would lose 
power over their district, and thus lose political capital that is often garnered through 
appropriating funds to their region with claims of progress.  The commission’s trust fund 
would be a mechanism that takes power away from them, creating an independent 
funding source.69  Mr. Munson’s comments are supported by testimony by Senator 
Bennett (R-UT), during a Capitol Hill Hearing of the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works, May 24, 2000. 11 Feb. 2004.  Senator Bennett  testified against a trust 
fund bill (not a private trust fund), stating: “I’m troubled with the idea of setting up yet 
another trust fund with a dedicated source of revenue for that trust fund.  That trend 
throughout the government as a whole bothers me because if we end up with a 
government of a series of trust funds, a dedicated revenue for dedicated purposes, we 
ultimately destroy the power of the Congress to allocate resources where they’re most 
needed.”70 Establishing another trust fund could abrogate Congress’s constitutional 
responsibilities and powers to allocate funding. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
The commission’s ability to capitalize their trust fund depends on a number of 
factors, foremost the resources available to the commission to conduct fund raising and 
also the calculation of how much their fund raising will benefit the trust fund: effort of 
fund raising methods vs. benefit to the trust fund.  Under some circumstances, should the 
commission desire to capitalize the fund through federal means, the question of legality 
that must be answered.  And finally, the commission will have to assess the political 
ramifications that would affect funding.  To what degree can the commission’s private 
trust fund be capitalized before affecting the federal government’s willingness to 
continue fully funding the Great Lakes Fishery Commission; at what level of financial 
independence (from the private trust fund’s capitalization) is the government’s power-of-
the-purse considered under threat?  Will Congress react to a self-sufficient, independent 
funding mechanism by reducing their annual contributions to the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission’s trust fund?  Finally, at what level of capitalization of the trust fund would 
offset a reduction in federal funding, and therefore begin self-sufficiency? 
This paper concludes that there are two major avenues to capitalize the 
commission’s trust fund, through federal means and other means (both described in 
section 6.1).  Should the commission choose to attempt the capitalization, in all or part, 
through federal means, the commission would have to calculate the political feasibility of 
approaching the federal government, and it would have to calculate the consequences of 
continuing its control and research programs while this process took place (should the 
federal government agree to capitalizing the fund).  Would the federal government give 
the full amount in one lump sum or in installments – and either way, would this funding 
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scheme allow for the commission to conduct its operations during the fiscal year that this 
took place without compromising either the trust fund’s planned financial ability to fully 
fund the commission in the future, or the ability of the commission to conduct its control 
and research programs without a break.  Should the commission wish to pursue other 
means of capitalizing the trust fund, the commission will need to assess the best approach 
(and its legality) in terms of benefits vs. efforts, while also gauging its final goal (e.g. 
supplemental or fully funding the program).  Finally, the commission will need to assess 
the reaction of the federal government to the capitalization of their trust fund, realizing it 
could be viewed as a competitive, independent source of funding that could take power 
away from Congress and, therefore, create a reaction that would compromise future 
annual appropriations, hampering the ability of the commission to conduct its full control 
and research programs. 
   
7 Conclusion/Discussion 
For 100 years the sea lamprey has been living in the Great Lakes.  By the 1940s 
and 1950s the once thriving fishery was destroyed; harvests in the Great Lakes fell to 
nearly zero and the way of life for millions in the region disappeared.  Since its 
conception in 1955, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission has fought the spread and 
prominence of lampreys with success; reducing sea lamprey populations by 90% in most 
areas within the Great Lakes.71  The success of the commission has been contingent on 
relatively stable annual appropriations during the previous 50 years; however, annual 
appropriations as a funding mechanism during that same time, have been unstable, and at 
times the commission has had inadequate resources to perform its duties to the fullest.  
This has also meant that there have been fluctuations in the populations of sea lamprey, 
which in turn negatively affect the Great Lakes fishery, ecosystem, and ultimately the 
region’s economy. 
Therefore, in 1996, the commission established a private trust fund to eventually 
capitalize it to a degree that it could either assist in the function of the commission’s 
funding structure by accruing interest enough that it could supplement annual 
appropriations, bolstering the science research and augment the control efforts of the 
commission when the federal government gave adequate annual funding, or filling gaps 
when the federal government did not appropriate adequate funding; or should the trust 
fund be capitalized sufficiently, to serve as a surrogate funding source for the 
commission, due to the instability of the federal annual appropriations process. 
Evidence shows that when the commission was established in 1955, the framers 
of the convention, and thus the commission, had criteria for creating a substantial and 
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effective long-term program.  This translates, clearly, into a philosophy that is required 
for establishing a parallel funding mechanism to meet the long-term, effective ecosystem 
management and research programs that the commission has been engaged in for more 
than 50 years.   
The focus of this research was to determine the feasibility of funding an already 
established private trust fund of the commission as an alternative funding mechanism to 
replace annual appropriations, which is deemed as an unstable source of funding.  It has 
been established that the commission is a good candidate due to its current organizational 
structure, historical performance and the nature of the environmental and resource 
problems that the commission is addressing.  
The private trust fund is an appropriate, stable mechanism that can assist in the 
perpetual funding of long-term environmental issues, such as the one that the commission 
has addressed during the last half-century.  Established in a legal, transparent manner, the 
private trust fund can serve as a stable source of funding.  This mechanism is important 
not only for the commission, but for other entities throughout the United States who are 
working on long-term environmental stewardship issues.  The private trust fund can 
potentially serve as a constant, annual source of funding to address these issues.   
This paper concludes that a properly capitalized private trust fund is an effective 
mechanism for an organization such as the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, in that it 
will provide a perpetual source of funding to control the invasive species sea lamprey, an 
animal that given current technologies, will forever be in the Great Lakes.  The issue of 
how to capitalize the trust fund and what the potential ramifications, politically, would be 
of capitalizing the trust fund are actually the larger problem within this study, and had not 
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been foreseen prior to the development of the study.  To determine the feasibility of 
capitalizing the commission’s trust fund with enough money to practically supplement 
the commission’s research program or control program, or to fully fund and operate the 
commission’s overall programs indefinitely, the following issues must be addressed:   
 Obtaining an appropriate amount of money in the private trust fund so that annual 
interest covers the commission’s operating costs (and annual interest rates) 
perpetually; as well as future projected needs; and, 
 Congress’ relinquishing financial control over the commission, and thus reducing 
its political power of appropriations. 
While the hypothesis at the beginning of this paper does hold true – that “a secure, 
long-term mechanism of funding, such as a private trust fund, will enable the commission 
to address the threat of financial insufficiency, while optimizing Great Lakes ecosystem 
health” it appears that it is not feasible to capitalize the trust fund fully due to what is 
perceived as political weakening of Congressional appropriations committees.  Once a 
trust fund is capitalized, whether through public or private funds, congress could read this 
as a weakening of their powers, which could then have adverse effects of funding for 
future commission appropriations.  Nevertheless, should the trust fund be adequately 
funded with a one time donation/allocation, and thus the necessary funds were being 
produced through the normal operations (interest) of the trust fund, annual appropriations 
(and therefore political maneuvering) could become obsolete. 
These findings support the use of a private trust fund as a perpetual funding 
mechanism to address unremitting environmental issues, such as the invasive sea 
lamprey.  Further studies, however, are needed to ascertain the degree in which such a 
mechanism would be used as a supplement to conventional federal funding and where it 
could be implemented as the sole source of funding in perpetuity.  Another aspect of 
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future studies must also determine where the funding to capitalize the trust fund would 
come from: a federal source, private source(s), or a combination of the two. 
There are various levels of perpetual problems that need the attention of long-term 
stewardship.  For very obvious reasons, this paper focuses on the long-term stewardship 
of Great Lakes natural resources pertaining to the control of invasive species and 
specifically the sea lamprey.  It is essential, however, to note that perpetual problems 
exist in other aspects of society that are susceptible to the same funding instability that 
the commission faces, with long-term stewardship needs and the lack of perpetual 
funding that they require, not in harmony. 
It is the conclusion of this research that the private trust fund established by and 
for the Great Lakes Fishery Commission is an appropriate and suitable long-term funding 
mechanism.  Funded at the appropriate levels, the commission’s private trust fund will 
certainly act as a perpetual source of annual income to either supplement or fully fund the 
commission’s control and/or research operations.  Therefore, the commission will 
certainly need to investigate further the manner in which it attempts to capitalize their 
trust fund, and to what degree, to ensure that there are no undue political, social, or 
financial ramifications that could threaten the commission’s sea lamprey control 








Appendix A: Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries  
between the United States of America and Canada 
 
Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between the United 
States of America and Canada 
 
 
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada,  
• Taking note of the interrelation of fishery conservation problems and of the 
desirability of advancing fishery research in the Great Lakes,  
• Being aware of the decline of some of the Great Lakes fisheries,  
• Being concerned over the serious damage to some of these fisheries caused by the 
parasitic sea lamprey and the continuing threat which this lamprey constitutes for 
other fisheries,  
• Recognizing that joint and coordinated efforts by the United States of America 
and Canada are essential in order to determine the need for and the type of 
measures which will make possible the maximum sustained productivity in Great 
Lakes fisheries of common concern,  
Have resolved to conclude a convention and have appointed as their respective 
Plenipotentiaries:  
   
   
The Government of the United States of America: 
WALTER BEDELL SMITH, Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America, 
and  
WILLIAM C. HERRINGTON, Chairman of the Delegation of the United States of 
America to the Great Lakes Fisheries Conference, and  
   
   
The Government of Canada: 
ARNOLD DANFORD PATRICK HEENEY, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of Canada to the United States of America, and  
STEWART BATES, Chairman of the Delegation of Canada to the Great Lakes Fisheries 
Conference,  
   
who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and 





This Convention shall apply to Lake Ontario (including the St. Lawrence River from 
Lake Ontario to the forty-fifth parallel of latitude), Lake Erie, Lake Huron (including 
Lake St. Clair), Lake Michigan, Lake Superior and their connecting waters, hereinafter 
referred to as "the Convention Area." This Convention shall also apply to the tributaries 
of each of the above waters to the extent necessary to investigate any stock of fish of 
common concern, the taking or habitat of which is confined predominantly to the 
Convention Area, and to eradicate or minimize the populations of the sea lamprey 




1. The Contracting Parties agree to establish and maintain a joint commission, to be 
known as the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, hereinafter referred to as "the 
Commission," and to be composed of two national sections, a Canadian Section 
and a United States Section. Each Section shall be composed of not more than 
three members appointed by the respective Contracting Parties.  
2. Each Section shall have one vote. A decision or recommendation of the 
Commission shall be made only with the approval of both sections.  
3. Each Contracting Party may establish for its Section an advisory committee for 
each of the Great Lakes. The members of each advisory committee so established 
shall have the right to attend all sessions of the Commission except those which 
the Commission decides to hold in camera.  
  
ARTICLE III 
1. At the first meeting of the Commission and at every second subsequent annual 
meeting thereafter the members shall select from among themselves a Chairman 
and a Vice-Chairman, each of whom shall hold office from the close of the annual 
meeting at which he has been selected until the close of the second annual 
meeting there after. The Chairman shall be selected from one Section and the 
Vice-Chairman from the other Section. The offices of Chairman and Vice-
Chairman shall alternate biennially between the Sections.  
2. The seat of the Commission shall be at such place in the Great Lakes area as the 
Commission may designate.  
3. The Commission shall hold a regular annual meeting at such place as it may 
decide. It may hold such other meetings as may be agreed upon by the Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman and at such time and place as they may designate.  
4. The Commission shall authorize the disbursement of funds for the joint expenses 
of the Commission and may employ personnel and acquire facilities necessary for 
the performance of its duties.  
5. The Commission shall make such rules and by-laws for the conduct of its 
meetings and for the performance of its duties and such financial regulations as it 
deems necessary.  
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6. The Commission may appoint an Executive Secretary upon such terms as it may 
determine.  
7. The staff of the Commission may be appointed by the Executive Secretary in the 
manner determined by the Commission or appointed by the Commission itself on 
terms to be determined by it.  
8. The Executive Secretary shall, subject to such rules and procedures as may be 
determined by the Commission, have full power and authority over the staff and 
shall perform such functions as the Commission may prescribe. If the office of 
Executive Secretary is vacant, the Commission shall prescribe who shall exercise 
such power or authority.  
  
ARTICLE IV 
The Commission shall have the following duties:  
(a) to formulate a research program or programs designed to determine the need for 
measures to make possible the maximum sustained productivity of any stock of fish in 
the Convention Area which, in the opinion of the Commission, is of common concern to 
the fisheries of the United States of America and Canada and to determine what measures 
are best adapted for such purpose;  
(b) to coordinate research made pursuant to such programs and, if necessary, to undertake 
such research itself;  
(c) to recommend appropriate measures to the Contracting Parties on the basis of the 
findings of such research programs;  
(d) to formulate and implement a comprehensive program for the purpose of eradicating 
or minimizing the sea lamprey populations in the Convention Area; and  
(e) to publish or authorize the publication of scientific and other information obtained by 




In order to carry out the duties set forth in Article IV, the Commission may:  
(a) conduct investigations;  
(b) take measures and install devices in the Convention Area and the tributaries thereof 
for lamprey control; and  





1. In the performance of its duties, the Commission shall, in so far as feasible, make 
use of the official agencies of the Contracting parties and of their Provinces or 
States and may make use of private or other public organizations, including 
international organizations, or of any person.  
2. The Commission may seek to establish and maintain working arrangements with 




Upon the request of the Commission a Contracting Party shall furnish such information 
pertinent to the Commission's duties as is practicable. A Contracting Party may establish 




1. Each Contracting Party shall determine and pay the expenses of its Section. Joint 
expenses incurred by the Commission shall be paid by contributions made by the 
Contracting Parties. The form and proportion of the contributions shall be those 
approved by the contracting Parties after the Commission has made a 
recommendation.  
2. The Commission shall submit an annual budget of anticipated joint expenses to 
the Contracting Parties for approval.  
  
ARTICLE IX 
The Commission shall submit annually to the Contracting Parties a report on the 
discharge of its duties. It shall make recommendations to or advise the Contracting 




Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as preventing any of the States of the 
United States of America bordering on the Great Lakes or, subject to their constitutional 
arrangements, Canada or the Province of Ontario from making or enforcing laws or 
regulations within their respective jurisdictions relative to the fisheries of the Great Lakes 





The Contracting Parties agree to enact such legislation as may necessary to give effect to 





The Contracting Parties shall jointly review in the eighth year of the operation of this 
Convention the activities of the Commission in relation to the objectives of the 
Convention in order to determine the desirability of continuing, modifying or terminating 




1. This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be 
exchanged at Ottawa.  
2. This Convention shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification. It shall remain in force for ten years and shall continue 
in force thereafter until terminated as provided herein.  
3. Either Contracting Party may, by giving two years' written notice to the other 
Contracting Party, terminate this Convention at the end of the initial ten-year 
period or at any time thereafter.  
   
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present 
Convention.  
   
DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this tenth day of September, 1954.  
   
   
For the Government of the United States of America: 
(Signed) WALTER BEDELL SMITH  
(Signed) Wm. C. HERRINGTON  
   
   
For the Government of Canada: 
(Signed) A. D. P. HEENEY  







Appendix B: Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956 
 
GREAT LAKES FISHERY ACT OF 195672  
16 U.S.C. §§ 931-939c, June 4, 1956, as amended 1986.  
Overview. The Act sets forth procedures for carrying out programs under the 1954 
Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries.  
Selected Definitions. Commission:  Great Lakes Fishery Commission. Convention:  
September 10, 1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, between the U.S. and Canada. 
Great Lakes:  Lake Ontario (including the Saint Lawrence River from Lake Ontario to the 
forty-fifth parallel of latitude), Lake Erie, Lake Huron (including Lake Saint Clair), Lake 
Michigan or Lake Superior. Great Lakes state:  Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania or Wisconsin. § 931.  
Commissioners and Advisory Committees. The Act directs the President to appoint 
four Commissioners, who will not be compensated, to represent the U.S. on the 
Commission. One Commissioner must be an official of the U.S. government and three 
must be individuals who reside in different Great Lakes states and are knowledgeable 
regarding the fisheries of the Great Lakes, except one must also be an official of a Great 
Lakes state. § 932.  
The U.S. Section is to appoint an advisory committee, composed of not more than four 
members, for each of the Great Lakes. Selections will be made from a list composed by 
the governor of the state, giving consideration to:   state agencies having jurisdiction over 
fisheries; the commercial fishing industry of the lake; the sport fishing of the lake; the 
public at large. A member may be appointed to more than one committee. No 
compensation will be given to advisory committee members, except not more than five 
members of all committees may be paid transportation expenses and per diem by the U. 
S. government incident to attending each meeting of the Commission or the U.S. Section. 
§ 933.  
Implementation. In order to carry out obligations under the Convention, the U.S. Section 
is authorized to:   acquire real property; construct, operate and maintain projects designed 
to facilitate compliance with Convention provisions relating to the sea lamprey control 
program; enter into contract or agreement with a state, public or private agency, or 
individual for the construction, operation or maintenance of a project. § 935.  
The Secretary is authorized to transfer lamprey control projects to the U.S. Section and to 
act on behalf of the U.S. Section to carry out the provisions of the Act. § 936.  
Notification. At least 30 days before approving a proposal to utilize a lamprey control 
measure or install a device on a stream, the U.S. Section must give notice to the official 
agency having jurisdiction over fisheries in each state in which the stream flows. § 938.  
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When the Commission recommends a conservation measure, the Secretary of State will 
give a copy of the recommendation, with comments, to the governor of each Great Lakes 
state for consideration. Other public agencies will also be informed. § 939.  
Other Provisions. Agencies of the U.S. government are authorized to cooperate with the 
U.S. Section to conduct research programs and related activities on a reimbursable basis, 
and to enter into agreements to assist in carrying out the program for control of lamprey 
production. § 939a.  
The Act will not prevent a Great Lakes state from making or enforcing laws as long as 
they do not conflict with the Convention or the Act. § 939b.  
Appropriations Authorized. Congress authorized to be appropriated funds necessary to 
carry out the provisions of the Act. § 939c.  
Appendix C: A Joint Strategic Plan  
for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries 
 
BACKGROUND 
This Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries1 was first proposed in 
December 1980 and adopted in 1981 as a commitment to interjurisdictional coordinated 
fishery management based upon an ecosystem approach. Except for the addition of two 
ratifying Parties2 in 1989, the Plan remained unchanged until the Parties revised it in 
1997. 
The 1997 revisions were intended to strengthen the Plan based upon a review of progress 
made and by applying lessons learned in implementing the original Plan. They were 
approved by the Parties in accordance with the terms of the Memorandum of Acceptance 
of the Joint Strategic Plan for Management of the Great Lakes Fisheries, which provides 
that any changes to the Plan should be accomplished by consensus, utilizing procedures 
similar to those used in developing the Plan. Guided by the same principles and using the 
same "steering committee" approach that led to the original Plan, the Parties developed 
and adopted the 1997 revisions based upon their commitment to and definition of 
consensus embodied in the Plan. 
 
The Original Plan -- 1981 
In adopting the original Plan in 1981, the Parties recognized that varied interest groups 
had become active and influential in determining the uses and environmental 
management of the Great Lakes. At that time, the ecosystem approach to Great Lakes 
management already was accepted by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission and the 
International Joint Commission, and recognized that any impact on a part of the system 
may to some degree affect an entire lake, connecting channels, and even the entire basin. 
Hence, lakewide-basinwide perspectives were recognized as essential to effective 
management. In revising the Plan in 1997, the parties reaffirmed this ecosystem approach 
to Great Lakes management. Thus, they also reaffirmed their agreement that a strong, 
practical, strategic Great Lakes fisheries management plan is necessary to ensure the 
public=s fishery resources receive full recognition and consideration in the present and 
proposed activities of any user and that the Plan should prove particularly beneficial in 
coordinating environmental and fishery agency Great Lakes management efforts into a 
complementary process, thus helping to protect and, where possible, to enhance Great 
Lakes fishery resources. 
The Parties viewed the Great Lakes Fishery Commission as the logical forum for their 
development of the original Plan and for the 1997 revision. The Commission provided 
the Parties with financial, logistical, and technical support, and played an important 
coordinating role, in particular through the Parties' utilization of the Commission's 
management committee structure, e.g., Lake Committees, Great Lakes Fish Health 
Committee.  
While the Commission played an important international, interjurisdictional, coordinating 
role, the Plan was to recognize the constitutional and other legal responsibilities of the 
management agencies to manage their respective fishery resources. The Parties 
understood that: commitment to the Plan must be secured from high-ranking fishery 
agency officials; these officials and their staffs should be involved from the beginning so 
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that the product would be their plan and the originators would then become advocates and 
implementers; and the Plan must be strategic in scope, forming an umbrella under which 
operational plans could be developed for each of the lakes and connecting channels. 
Thus, all of the efforts to develop the original Plan and the 1997 revisions were designed 
to secure the prerequisite consensus of the Parties. 
In developing the original Plan, high-ranking natural resource administrators from 
agencies with Great Lakes fishery responsibilities, with the support and assistance of the 
Commission's secretariat, determined the scope of the proposed activity; the roles and 
responsibilities of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, participating agencies, interested 
agencies, interested organizations, and the public; and committee structure and terms of 
reference. By signing the Plan, they committed the involved agencies. An 
interjurisdictional Steering Committee was created and charged to: a) identify the broad 
key problem areas that must be addressed to comprehensively manage the Great Lakes 
fishery resources now and in the future; b) develop the planning process to be used for 
the Plan; and c) develop the framework of what should be included in the Plan. 
The administrators eventually formed themselves into the Committee of the Whole, one 
member from each agency. They approved the proposed planning process and reserved 
for themselves final review of the Plan before submission to the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission and the agencies. They also: decided the membership of the Steering 
Committee would include a representative from each state, the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries Service, plus two each from the 
Province of Ontario and Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans; named the 
members; and charged them to select cochairmen from Canada and the United States to 
carry out the planning process, to produce a plan by appointing work groups, reviewing 
products, communicating with jurisdictions and making whatever other effort was 
necessary to meet their charge. 
The Steering Committee carried out its charge by forming workgroups to develop the 
draft common goal statement, major issue statements, and strategic procedures. In 
developing these, the Steering Committee relied upon responses to a questionnaire the 
was submitted to all Great Lakes fishery agencies, the results of a workshop funded by 
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, and many documents such as individual fishery 
agency plans and other strategic fishery management documents from the various 
jurisdictions. 
The efforts of the Committee of the Whole and Steering Committee resulted in the 
December 1980 draft Plan that was formally ratified by the original twelve Parties 
through the 1981 Memorandum of Acceptance.  
 
1986 Plan Revision 
A 1986 review of the Plan (Great Lakes Fishery Commission Special Publication 88-1) 
resulted in the Parties' invitation for two additional agencies to sign . In May 1989, the 
Chippewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority and the Great Lakes Indian 
Fish and Wildlife Commission joined the original twelve fishery agencies in endorsing 
and signing the Memorandum of Acceptance for the Plan. The 1986 review reaffirmed the 
wisdom and necessity of the Plan, and offered additional strategies that were not formally 
incorporated into the Plan but that have been acted upon. One such strategy was the 
institution of the State of the Lakes report system. 
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1997 Plan Revision 
In 1995, the Parties agreed to review the collective progress in implementing the Plan. In 
so agreeing, they affirmed their commitment to the Plan and its consensus strategy -- the 
Plan would not be changed without reaching consensus. As was done in developing the 
original Plan, the Parties appointed an interjurisdictional Review Steering Committee to 
facilitate the Parties' review by identifying issues, ways to better implement the original 
Plan, or ways in which the Plan could be improved to better fulfill its intent and to meet 
new challenges. 
One such challenge was the need to better coordinate and integrate fisheries and 
environmental ecosystem management initiatives, particularly regarding implementation 
of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the United States and Canada 
(WQA). The WQA, Annex 2, calls for the development of Remedial Action Plans 
(RAPS) and Lakewide Management Plans (LAMPS) embodying a systematic and 
comprehensive approach to restore and protect beneficial uses in Areas of Concern and in 
open lake waters. The Parties have attempted to meet this challenge by incorporating 
strengthened fisheries management/environmental management coordination Strategic 
Procedures into the Plan. 
With the logistical, financial, and technical support of the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission, the Review Steering Committee prepared a questionnaire to obtain input 
from those individuals associated with efforts to implement the Plan and those closely 
allied with related initiatives. From the survey's results, the Review Steering Committee 
identified a number of issues for consideration during the review process. The Committee 
prepared discussion papers on these issues that were considered at a workshop attended 
by many of the survey participants and others active in fishery and environmental 
management programs. Eventually, the Review Steering Committee prepared draft 
revisions to the Plan consistent with its charge. It provided its rationale for its 
recommendations in a background document that was presented to the Parties along with 
the draft revisions. The Parties adopted the proposed revisions, and incorporated them 
into the Plan as presented in this document. See Great Lakes Fishery Commission Special 
Publication 97-___. 
The Plan recognizes that the Great Lakes Fishery Commission=s individual lake 
committees will be the major action arms for its implementation and for developing 
operational plans. The Commission's Great Lakes Fish Health Committee also plays an 
important role. At the same time, the Plan recognizes the continuing role of the 
Commission's Council of Lake Committees as a formal review group to evaluate 
recommendations made by individual lake committees to their members= agencies and to 
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission that may affect two or more lakes, or connecting 
channels. 
However, the Plan also recognizes the need for the Parties themselves to ensure that they 
provide timely and effective direction in the Plan's implementation. It replaces the ad hoc 
Committee of the Whole and its Operations Subcommittee with a formally defined 
Council of Great Lakes Fishery Agencies, on which each Party is represented, to ensure 
mutual accountability of the Parties in the implementation and periodic review of the 
Plan and to provide guidance within the Plan's institutional arrangements, among other 
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responsibilities. The Plan contemplates that a Council representative will be a Fish Chief 
or equivalent and will have the authority to act on behalf of the appointing Party.  
The Plan is designed to be a very practical tool for coordinating efforts of environmental 
management or natural resource offices and fishery agencies to provide mutual benefits 
and protection of the Great Lakes aquatic system. The Parties recognize the continuing 
imperative to accept and implement the Plan as quickly as possible to protect Great Lakes 
fishery resources from continued degradation and to eventually help restore some of the 
lost Great Lakes fishery resources. 
 
 
COMMON GOAL STATEMENT FOR GREAT LAKES FISHERY 
AGENCIES 
An essential first step in developing a common strategy for Great Lakes fishery agencies 
is to ensure that the agencies hold common goals. Goal statements were obtained from all 
the agencies and compared for commonalities, differences and conflicts. There are no 
overt conflicts of purpose among agencies and relatively few differences. Differences are 
largely matters of emphasis or coverage. Similarities of agency goals were used to 
formulate a goal statement which we believe adequately represents the aims of the 
various agencies with respect to the Great Lakes. 
To secure fish communities, based on foundations of stable self-sustaining stocks, 
supplemented by judicious plantings of hatchery-reared fish, and provide from these 
communities an optimum contribution of fish, fishing opportunities and associated 




employment and income, and 
a healthy aquatic ecosystem. 
The fishery resources of the Great Lakes are held in trust for society by government. The 
agencies responsible for them have been charged to manage the fishery resources and 
fisheries to provide continuing valuable contributions to society. These contributions 
include such benefits as a healthy aquatic environment, aesthetic and recreational values, 
scientific knowledge and economic activity as well as fish and fishing opportunities. 
The fishery resources have been diminished and much altered through exploitation, 
degradation of habitat and the introduction or invasion of exotic biota. Much has been 
done to check, reverse or compensate for this degradation but much remains to be done. 
The fact that environmental considerations important to such efforts are often under the 
jurisdiction of other agencies could complicate the task facing the fishery agencies. 
Stresses affecting fishery resources rarely act singly, often have complex interactions and 
often impact several levels of the aquatic ecosystem so that remedial management must 
address problems on a comprehensive whole-system basis. A natural focus of the fishery 
agencies, therefore, is the maintenance and development of entire fish communities 
which can provide improved contributions to society. Such an ecosystem approach 
requires protection and rehabilitation of aquatic habitat and fishery management to ensure 
stable self-sustaining foundations, especially at forage levels, for the community while 
allowing for judicious stocking of hatchery-reared fish to complement or enhance natural 
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GREAT LAKES FISHERY ISSUES 
Prior to the signing of the Plan in 1981, senior federal, state and provincial fishery 
managers were asked to respond to an AIssues Questionnaire@ by assigning a rating to 
each of the following 5 major issues. This was seen as a necessary step in the process of 
developing strategies to achieve a common goal. Issues were defined as impediments to 
achieving the goal.  
The management agencies were polled to obtain an understanding of their concerns, and 
the Great Lakes Basin Commission was contracted by the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission to conduct a workshop to provide input from other interested groups. The 
1996 Plan Review Steering Committee concluded that the major issues have not changed 
dramatically but it is clear in the intervening 15 years some issues have become more and 
some less important. Few, if any, have been eliminated and at least one new issue has 
emerged. 
 
Lost Fishing Opportunities 
Since the turn of the century there has been a progressive depletion of many indigenous 
fish stocks due to overharvest, habitat loss, and exotic species.. Various individual stocks 
of highly valued lake trout, whitefish, lake herring, walleye, deepwater cisco, and lake 
sturgeon have collapsed and been replaced by other, often less valuable species. The loss 
of indigenous species such as blue pike, shortnose cisco, and Atlantic salmon, as well as 
other fish adapted to specific environments represents a loss of genetic material 
impossible to replace. 
In 1981 and today, commercial yields of fish from many areas of the Great Lakes are still 
substantially below historic levels and commercial fishing enterprises which formerly 
relied on larger, high-market-value fish continue to depend on other species once 
considered of low value but now in significant demand (e.g., yellow perch).  
In some areas, opportunities for recreational angling have been severely reduced and the 
tourist industry has suffered from the loss of sport fishing business, causing substantial 
reductions in employment and income. But in other areas, emphasis on stocking and 
innovative sport fishery management by fishery agencies have dramatically increased the 
economic value of the associated industry. Today, as in 1981, throughout most of the 
Great Lakes, the economic value of the recreational fishery far exceeds that of the 
commercial fishery but both sectors provide valuable income for Canadians and 
Americans. 
Tribal fisheries are important to tribal cultural heritage and have high value for religious, 
medicinal, subsistence and economic reasons. The resurgence in recent decades of tribal 
fisheries resulting from a number of court decisions has been constrained by collapsed 
fish stocks..  
In 1981, chemical contaminants were seen as one of the most serious problems facing 
Great Lakes fishery and environmental agencies. The problem remains despite the 
significant progress made in both countries in reducing point source inputs and as a result 
of new restrictive legislation. However, contaminated sediments and the long range 
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transport of persistent toxic chemicals into the Great Lakes basin remain as problems. 
Overall, levels of persistent toxic chemicals in most top predator fish have declined 
dramatically but there are still many contaminant advisories in both countries. 
 
Instability of Fish Communities 
Although rehabilitation of some fish stocks has continued over the past 15 years, some 
stocks remain depleted, some are still not self-sustaining and others still lack stability. 
Still others, though stable, continue to depend on management programs for their 
stability. Instability of Great Lakes fish stocks results from the following stresses: 
 
Sea Lamprey 
The parasitic sea lamprey, although significantly controlled in most areas, continues to 
have an adverse impact on the Great Lakes Ecosystem. Specifically, the development of 
larval populations in connecting channels and lake environments where traditional 
control technology is not effective (e.g., St. Marys River) has resulted in a resurgence of 
some sea lamprey populations. Implementation of new control techniques such as sterile 
male release hold promise for control in these areas. Nevertheless, as in 1981, the 
continued dependence of the control program on lampricides makes it vulnerable to 
problems in chemical supply and to attitudes towards pesticide, regulation, and licensing. 




In the past, inadequate assessment of fish stocks and poor control and monitoring of the 
harvest have led to depleted stocks and disrupted fish communities. The historic 
depletion of lake trout in southeastern Lake Superior and lake sturgeon basinwide are 
examples of this issue. 
The present concern is that agency capabilities to assess sport, commercial, and forage 
stock status may be further compromised as a result of dwindling staff numbers due to 
downsizing and reduced program resources. 
 
Invasions and Introductions 
Invasions by numerous exotics such as alewives and rainbow smelt have disrupted 
ecosystems and fish communities. The introduction of other exotic fish can modify fish 
communities to the extent that fishing opportunities are severely altered or reduced. 
Purposeful introductions of top predators such as salmon and trout may complement fish 
community structures, stabilize certain stocks of forage species and provide new fishing 
opportunities. However, fishery managers also need to be vigilant that stocking of top 
predators does not destabilize the communities they seek to enhance.  
This sub-issue ranks highly as one that has become more of a problem since the Plan was 
first signed. The zebra mussel, which was introduced into the Great Lakes from the 
ballast of a trans oceanic freighter, has forever altered the ecology, flow of energy, and 
possibly fish community in Lake Erie. The ruffe is expected to further change the 
dynamics of the Lake Erie fishery when it invades and establishes breeding populations. 
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Other recent invaders include two forms of goby, a large cladoceran (Bythotrephes) and 
numerous other fish species that probably have not yet established breeding populations. 
 
Inadequate Environmental Quality 
Degradation of water quality, destruction of physical habitat, and impairment of 
ecosystem components critical to the well-being of fish remain as major causes of 
impairment and destruction of Great Lakes fish communities and fisheries. In order to 
protect fishery habitats and ensure adequate spawning success, the environmental 
objectives of fishery agencies must be the same as or more stringent than those of 
environmental agencies. Thus, the actions of both are complementary and should be 
coordinated. 
Chemical contaminants in fish throughout the Great Lakes basin have raised continuing 
concern for the health of those who eat Great Lakes fish, dampened the desire to fish for 
recreation and rendered large quantities of fish flesh unavailable to the consumer. 
Discoveries of contaminants such as PCB, mirex, dioxin and furans, dieldrin, mercury 
and DDT in fish have resulted in continuing restrictions on the consumption of some 
Great Lakes fish. Encouraged by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, efforts have been 
underway for several years for jurisdictions to establish a common set of consumption 
advisories. 
The ecosystem view of fishery management espoused by the fishery agencies, and 
reflected by the 1978 Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and 
its 1987 Protocol, places particular emphasis on water quality and various habitat features 
that are required for normal functioning of fishes and unrestricted consumption of fish. 
Attempts to secure such an environment has placed fishery interests in conflict with the 
interests of other water resources and users. All agencies must address the threats to 
Great Lakes fishery resources posed by conflicting uses. 
 
Land Uses. A wide variety of land uses adversely influence the quality of the fishery 
resource. Some agricultural and forestry practices and urban developments create 
problems of increased runoff, erosion, and loadings of nutrients, silt, and contaminants. 
Highway construction and maintenance causes siltation, herbicide and salt 
accumulations. Leaching from old industrial waste sites continues to pose problems 
relating to contaminants in the rivers and waters of the Great Lakes. Major efforts are 
underway in both countries to remediate these problems by cleaning up old dump sites. 
 
Water Uses. Lakes and streams are used for a variety of purposes including: waste 
disposal; domestic, water power, industrial and agricultural water supply; navigation; 
recreation; and fishing. This variety of use leads to conflicts among users, water quality 
degradation and inter-agency conflicts, all of which interfere with the maintenance and 
improvement of productive levels of a water fishery resource. More recently there has 
been concern that excessive amounts of Great Lakes water will be diverted from the basin 
to areas short of fresh water. 
A variety of activities destroy fish habitat in the Great Lakes basin. Unnatural variations 
in lake levels cause shoreline erosion, increased needs for navigational dredging, changes 
in wetlands and estuarine environments, and changes in the distribution and availability 
of in-lake spawning and nursery grounds. Drainage projects, canal construction, stream 
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channelization and power generation interfere with fish migrations and may adversely 
affect stream conditions. Impingement and entrainment at water intakes, particularly 
those associated with the power generating industry, kill large numbers of fish. Mineral 
extractions and mining cause direct loss and disruption of fish habitat, and probable loss 
of spawning shoals. Dredging, navigation and associated facilities cause erosion, 
siltation, changes in near-shore currents, and destruction of habitat. A prime example is 
the loss of the largest rapids in the entire St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system by 
construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and power project in 1958. With that 
development New York and Ontario lost an excellent walleye fishery that has never been 
replaced. 
 
Atmospheric Inputs. Research has shown there are major inputs of airborne nutrients 
and contaminants from industrial and other sources from areas hundreds and even 
thousands of kilometers outside the Great Lakes basin. Models suggest that Lake 
Superior may receive as much as 90% of its PCBs from airborne deposition and much of 
that from sources originating outside the basin. Excessive levels of toxaphene in some 
Lake Superior fish is believed to have resulted from sources outside the basin.  
 
Competition and Conflicts among Users of the Fishery Resources 
Difficulties in providing desired contributions of fish and fishing opportunities arise 
largely from the difficulty of identifying the harvestable surpluses and of allocating them 
to competing users. For most stocks of common concern, needed decisions will have to 
be based on the best scientific studies available. Fundamental to the allocation problem is 
an understanding of society=s needs and measures of values associated with those needs. 
The major user conflicts over Great Lakes fishery resources are summarized as follows. 
 
Allocation among Jurisdictions. Protection of fish stocks from overexploitation by any 
or all user groups is a paramount responsibility of all fishery agencies. Fishery agencies 
need to make joint allocation decisions on stocks of common concern. Depletion and loss 
of important fish stocks will continue regardless of environmental improvements unless 
acceptable allocation systems are implemented. 
 
Commercial Fishing versus Sport Fishing. Commercial and recreational fishermen 
often compete for fishery resources. The interests and activities of one group can 
adversely impact those of the other. Each group is opposed to allocation decisions which 
appear to be unfavorable to their specific interests. Similarly there are conflicts within 
each of these groups regarding species mix and allocation. 
 
Native People versus Other Users. Rights and claims of use by aboriginal people can 
lead to allocation questions between jurisdictions and other fisheries interests. 
 
Access to the Resource. The shoreline of the lower Great Lakes and tributaries has in 
some cases been forever altered through the construction of industrial complexes, 
residential development and other major works. Such practices have presented users of 
the fishery resources with formidable problems in gaining access to their fishery. As a 
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result, some agencies are faced with the task of creating access for anglers and providing 
mooring facilities for anglers and commercial fishermen. 
 
New Emerging Issues: 
 
Climate Change 
There is concern that a warming climate may significantly alter the Great Lakes 
ecosystems in many ways. Changes could affect water quality, water quantity, and 
biological integrity causing, for example, favorable conditions for the invasion of more 
exotic species at the expense of indigenous species.  
 
 
STRATEGIES FOR GREAT LAKES FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
In recent decades, particularly under the Plan's auspices, fishery agencies have been 
successful in resolving, or partially resolving, some management problems. Certainly, the 
level of successful sea lamprey control in the Great Lakes is a monument to cooperative 
international effort. The establishment of a new salmonid sport fishery and the partial 
rehabilitation of the lake trout fishery are other proud accomplishments. However, the 
issues described earlier remain at least partially unresolved because they continue to 
generate problems which are intractable even with the Plan's processes in place. 
To assist fishery and environmental agencies in dealing with these problems, efforts 
remain underway to identify underlying obstacles which have thwarted past efforts, to 
suggest broad strategies to resolve them and to propose a coherent set of procedures to 
initiate implementation. The fundamental strategies suggested are a consensus strategy, 
an accountability strategy, an ecosystem management strategy and a management 
information strategy. 
These strategies are essentially the same strategies adopted at the Plan's inception in 
1981. The ecosystem management strategy, incorporated as part of the 1997 revisions, 
simply is a refinement of the original environmental management strategy. It better 
reflects the Plan's underlying ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management and the 
need to influence all practices with potential to affect desired fish communities. 
 
Consensus Strategy 
There is no intent in the Plan to usurp or weaken the fishery agencies= legal 
responsibilities to their Great Lakes fishery resources. Through the signing of a 
memorandum of acceptance by all Great Lakes fishery agencies, the Plan does recognize 
the need for formal acceptance and implementation of the Plan by those agencies. The 
Plan also recognizes the absolute need for fishery and associated agencies to be flexible, 
particularly at the lakewide operational level, if the plan is to be successfully 
implemented. The consensus strategy proposed here should help develop such flexibility, 
not to mention providing significant help in obtaining financial and political support for 
individual agency initiatives. 
A frequent obstacle to effective resolution of issues is a lack of cooperative agency 
action. Even when a clear common purpose is agreed upon, individual agencies are 
sometimes unable to perform effectively for want of adequate financial or political 
support. Clearly, the establishment of consensus (see Appendix I.E. for a definition) 
87 
among agencies would not only strengthen all of them in their individual requests for 
support of needed management initiatives but would also provide a good deal of 
incentive to act in accordance with the group interest and intent. Therefore: 
Consensus must be achieved when management will significantly influence the interests 
of more than one jurisdiction. 
 
Accountability Strategy 
It is apparent that positive participation in the Consensus management process would be 
encouraged by application of management by objectives at the inter-agency level. This 
implies, of course, open disclosure of each agency=s individual programs and plans in 
terms of operational objectives, targets and performance. This would not only provide for 
mutual evaluation of any management proposals which might affect another=s interests 
but make a major contribution to the development of integrated operational programming 
employing the best available fisheries science and technology. Therefore: 
Fishery management agencies must be openly accountable for their performance. 
 
Ecosystem Approach to Fishery Management Strategy 
In the context of ecosystem management, the Parties must influence and respond to all 
practices -- not just the fishery management activities of other Parties -- which affect fish 
communities. Great Lakes fishery management and environmental management agencies 
need to address the potential impacts of overlapping activities and decisions in an effort 
to coordinate and harmonize fishery and other environmental needs and objectives. The 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission and all Parties to the Plan will engage in a process of 
structured, multi-level, ongoing dialogue with federal, state, provincial, and tribal 
environmental agencies, e.g., through exercises such as lakewide management plans, 
remedial action plans, fish community objectives, state of the lake reports, etc. Also of 
particular concern is the protection of the aquatic ecosystem from introductions of non-
native species contrary to the Plan's procedures. Therefore: 
The Parties must exercise their full authority and influence in every available arena to 
meet the biological, chemical, and physical needs of desired fish communities. 
 
Management Information Strategy 
Information useful as a guide to management practice is a precious commodity. Where it 
exists, it is vitally important that it be readily available for application wherever 
appropriate. However, agencies involved in fisheries and environmental management on 
the Great Lakes have generated a variety of data which is often inadequate for measuring 
and predicting the effects of management decisions on a lakewide basis. Therefore: 
Fishery agencies must cooperatively develop means of measuring and predicting the 
effects of fishery and environmental management decisions. 
Because all Great Lakes fishery agencies share similar problems there should be basin-
wide commonality in and accessibility to information collected and used to measure and 
predict the effect of decisions. 
Many user groups are continuously imposing stresses on Great Lakes fishery resources, 
often without prompt response from fishery agencies. It is important that fishery 
management agencies make necessary decisions as quickly as possible and nothing in this 
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strategy should be construed as suggesting that urgent decisions can be delayed until 




The strategic procedures are designed to achieve the common goal and implement the 
strategies set forth in the Plan. They also recognize the responsibility of managing the 
Great Lakes ecosystem through coordination between fishery management and 
environmental agencies. The Parties have chosen the Great Lakes Fishery Commission's 
Lake Committees and Council of Lake Committees as the primary vehicles to implement 
these strategic procedures. The Council of Great Lakes Fisheries Agencies will maintain 
and support the processes outlined in the Plan. The Great Lakes Fishery Commission will 
facilitate the Plan's implementation.  
 
Consensus  
1. Fish Community Objectives -- The Great Lakes Fishery Commission will maintain 
Lake Committees which will define objectives for the structure of each of the Great 
Lakes fish communities and develop a means of measuring progress toward their 
achievement. Upon request of a lake committee the Commission will support 
development of fish community objectives that are comprehensive and principle-based. 
2. Operational Plans -- Each fishery agency should identify its plans, which may include 
joint lakewide fishery management plans, for achieving the fish community objectives 
identified by the lake committees.  
3. Changes in Practice -- Each fishery agency should submit all substantive changes 
from existing practice to the appropriate lake committee before implementation.  
4. Consensus on Changes -- Any agency proposal for change which other agencies 
believe will influence their interests may become the subject of negotiations within lake 
committees until consensus of affected agencies is achieved. 
5. Conflict Resolution -- If consensus cannot be achieved, a Party may:  
• request the Commission to arrange/facilitate an information exchange forum;  
• seek advice of existing Plan committees;  
• ask the Commission to arrange third-party mediation with any resolution being 
endorsed through normal Plan procedures; and / or  
• ask the Commission to arrange a process involving a mutually acceptable third-
party intermediary to make a non-binding recommendation.  
 
Ecosystem Management 
6. Environmental Issues -- The Lake Committees will identify environmental issues 
which relate to or may impede achievement of their fish community objectives and will 
work with other ecosystem initiatives, such as LaMPs, in developing and furthering plans 
for achieving, refining, and assessing progress on environmental and fish community 
objectives.  
7. Coordination with GLWQA / LaMPs -- Lake committees will work with LaMPs to 
develop joint proposals to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission or other organization to 
identify environmental needs relative to fish community objectives, related management 
plans and assessments, and to thereby provide feedback on fish community objectives. 
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8. Environmental Issue Resolution -- Unresolved or emerging environmental issues may 
be referred by lake committees to the Parties, Council of Great Lakes Fisheries Agencies, 
or the Great Lakes Fishery Commission to represent fishery interests in these issues to the 
most appropriate body or process.  
9. Habitat Advisory Board --The Great Lakes Fishery Commission will maintain an 
expert Habitat Advisory Board (HAB)to assist each lake committee, the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission, and the Parties to develop ecosystem objectives and identify critical 
habitats essential to achieving its fishery objectives. 
10. Exotic Species -- Fishery agencies shall collectively identify and promote procedures 
that will protect aquatic resources from unauthorized introductions of non-native species, 
e.g., via aquaculture and shipping.  
 
Information Sharing 
11. Data Standards -- The Great Lakes Fishery Commission will coordinate development 
and implementation of standards for recording and maintaining fishery management and 
assessment data, to ensure compatibility among the Parties and other agencies. 
12. Models -- The Great Lakes Fishery Commission and the Parties will coordinate 
development and implementation of models for common use by the Parties and other 
agencies  
13. Information Access -- The Parties are encouraged to maintain databases on the 
Internet. The Great Lakes Fishery Commission will maintain current Internet links to 
Party and others' databases to facilitate access, including a catalog of Great Lakes fishery 
assessment and research programs which are planned or in progress, 
14. Data Sharing -- The agencies are encouraged to provide their data to other agencies 
upon request if the collecting agency has had reasonable time to verify and interpret the 
data (such time should not normally exceed one year for assessment data and three years 
for research data) and to collectively develop shared information services under the 
umbrella of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
 
Accountability  
15. Decision Record -- Consensus decisions shall be recorded appropriately, e.g., 
meeting minutes. 
16.. Agency Reports -- The fishery agencies, separately or jointly, should measure and 
make annual reports to the Lake Committees of the progress made toward achieving their 
mutual committee objectives. 
17. Lake Committee Reports -- Each lake committee will prepare an annual progress 
report and make recommendations to both the agencies and the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission. In addition to annual reporting, on a rotational basis once every five years, 
each lake committee shall convene a special conference focused on the state of the lake. 
The product of this conference will be a formal report capable of serving as a 5-year 
report card on progress toward a comprehensive set of fish community objectives and 
related measures and indicators. 
18. Commission Report -- The Great Lakes Fishery Commission=s Annual Report to the 
governments and the public shall include a summary of the lake committee reports and 
recommendations regarding fishery and environmental objectives, programs, and 
activities needing specific attention. 
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Plan Governance  
19. Plan Changes -- All Parties must approve changes in or the addition of new Parties to 
the Plan. 
20. Council of Great Lakes Fishery Agencies -- The Parties hereby establish the Council 
of Great Lakes Fishery Agencies. Each Party will have representation on the Council. 
The Council shall establish terms of reference. The terms of reference should reflect 
decision-making by consensus of the Parties to:  
• ensure mutual accountability of the Parties;  
• ensure accountability for the implementation and periodic review of the Plan;  
• provide guidance and support to the Plan's institutional arrangements;  
• ensure timely and effective information exchange between law enforcement and 
fishery managers;  
• ensure that environmental objectives are articulated and reciprocal strategies with 
environmental agencies are developed;  
• provide for non-Party participation by Environment Canada, U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, the International Joint Commission, and other agencies as 
appropriate; and  
• inform and educate on a basin-wide perspective, including the development and 
implementation of a strategic communications framework that details the roles 
and responsibilities of the Parties and the Commission.  
The Council and the Commission shall cooperatively determine the appropriate 




By endorsing the Plan, the Parties accept the challenges that it presents. Those challenges 
have not diminished since the original Plan was adopted in 1981. Many remain the same, 
others have taken new forms, and new ones have emerged. 
Among the most important challenges are fiscal and institutional limitations. Rather than 
viewing these as obstacles, the Parties view them as opportunities -- opportunities to 
effectively cooperate and communicate in achieving mutually acceptable ecosystem 
protection goals and to use available human, infrastructure and fiscal resources 
efficiently. 
The Plan has many implications in terms of commitment for the agencies, particularly for 
their personnel who serve on lake and other committees. Many of these implications have 
not been specifically addressed in this document because it is deemed highly desirable at 
this point that any future planning should involve discussion by those people who 
ultimately will carry the bulk of the work loads. 
The Plan is in fact a proposal for the institution of a formal, on-going planning process in 
accordance with certain broad strategies and supported by proposals for their 
implementation. It is proposed that agencies should use their representation on Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission established individual lake committees as a means of 
representing their own interests and negotiating consensus decisions regarding joint 
concerns. Acceptance and implementation of the Plan requires considerable responsibility 
and activity for agency lake committee members and support staff. Where successful 
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implementation of the Plan is impeded by fiscal or personnel limitations, it may be 
necessary to supplement Lake Committee efforts through other collaborative initiatives 
under the umbrella of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission. In fact, it may be desireable 
to augment the resources of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission to provide the level of 
support necessary to implement the Plan.  
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MEMORANDUM OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN  
FOR MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES FISHERIES 
 
THIS MEMORANDUM OF ACCEPTANCE made and entered into this seventeenth day 
of June 1981, by and among the Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Illinois 
Department of Conservation, the Indiana Department of Natural Resources, the Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, the Ontario Ministry of 
Natural Resources, the Pennsylvania Fish Commission, the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.  
WITNESSETH:  
WHEREAS, the Parties hereto have long desired to adopt a Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, and  
WHEREAS, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, acting through its Steering Committee 
of the Committee of the Whole, prepared such a Joint Strategic Plan for Management of 
Great Lakes Fisheries after years of efforts, deliberations, and consultations, and  
WHEREAS, the Parties hereto have had the opportunity to review and change the drafts 
of the said Joint Strategic Plan, and  
WHEREAS, the Parties hereto have agreed that the Joint Strategic Plan for Management 
of Great Lakes Fisheries, dated December 1980, represents the final product of the best 
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efforts of the Parties and serves the best interests of the Parties hereto and the peoples of 
their states, province and nations.  
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual benefits to be derived herefrom, the 
Parties hereby covenant and agree as follows:  
1. The Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, dated December, 
1980, is hereby accepted and adopted by each and every Party signatory to this 
Memorandum of Acceptance.  
2. The Parties hereto pledge their support to the Goals set forth in the Joint Strategic Plan 
for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries and commit themselves to resolving the Great 
Lakes Fishery Issues raised in the Plan by jointly, severally, and individually adopting the 
Strategies for Great Lakes Fisheries Management set forth in the Plan.  
3. The Parties hereto accept the institutional arrangements and responsibilities as set forth 
in the Joint Strategic Plan and agree that changes to, or modifications of, the Joint 
Strategic Plan shall be accomplished by consensus, utilizing procedures similar to those 
used in developing and adopting the Joint Strategic Plan.  
4. The Parties hereto agree to adopt and execute the Strategic Procedures set forth in the 
Joint Strategic Plan and commit themselves and their agencies and instrumentalities to 
carrying out these procedures.  
5. Nothing in this Memorandum of Acceptance shall be construed as infringing on the 
sovereignty of any nation, province or state signatory to this document, but shall rather be 
construed as a commitment of the sovereign power of such nations, states and province to 
carrying out the Joint Strategic Plan hereby adopted.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have hereunto set their hands and seals, as of the 
date first written above at Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. CANADA  
DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/D. D. Tansley 
_____________________________________s/H. Douglas Johnston ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/David Kenney 
_____________________________________s/Maurine E. Richter ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) _____________________________________s/Bruce 
Muench  
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Joseph Cloud 
_____________________________________s/Frank R. Lockard ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Howard A. Tanner 
_____________________________________s/John A. Scott ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Joseph N. Alexander 
_____________________________________s/Jerome H. Kuehn ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Terry Leitzell 
_____________________________________s/Robert W. Hanks ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION 
93 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Robert F. Flacke 
_____________________________________s/Bruce D. Shupp ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Robert W. Teater 
_____________________________________s/Russell L. Scholl ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) ONTARIO MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Alan Pope 
_____________________________________s/A. S. Holder ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
PENNSYLVANIA FISH COMMISSION 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Ralph W. Abele 
_____________________________________s/Howard T. Hardie, Jr. ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Galen L. Buterbaugh 
_____________________________________s/G. Ray Arnett ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/Carroll D. Besadny 
_____________________________________s/James S. Christensen ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) _____________________________________s/James 
T. Addis  
 
 
Appendix A.1.  
 
ADDITIONAL SIGNERS TO THE MEMORANDUM OF 
ACCEPTANCE  
OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF GREAT 
LAKES FISHERIES 
The Chippewa/Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority and the Great Lakes Indian 
Fish and Wildlife Commission join with the twelve earlier signers of the Joint Strategic 
Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries in accepting and adopting the Plan as 
originally signed on 17 June 1981 at Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The additional signers 
hereunto set their hands at Montreal, Quebec, Canada on the ninth day of May 1989. 
CHIPPEWA/OTTAWA TREATY FISHERY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY 
ATTEST BY __________________________________ _____________________________________ ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE) 
GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH AND WILDLIFE COMMISSION 
ATTEST BY __________________________________ _____________________________________ ITS 
__________________________________(TITLE)  
 
Appendix B.  
RESERVATION TO THE MEMORANDUM OF ACCEPTANCE  
FOR THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF GREAT 
LAKES FISHERIES 
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources conditions its execution of this 
Memorandum of Acceptance on inclusion of the following clause: 
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This Memorandum of Acceptance shall be construed in a manner which recognizes the 
administrative rulemaking process of the states, nations or provinces signatory to this 
Memorandum and shall support full compliance with such processes when a course of 
action of a Party in furtherance of the Joint Strategic Plan is interpreted as an 
administrative rule by their sovereign. 
Counsel for the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, advises that the statement is 
not part of the agreement, but is to be used in construing the agreement. The statement 





RESOLUTION BY GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMMISSION  
TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES FISHERIES 
WHEREAS, fishery resources and associated uses are among the most sensitive of all 
uses made of the Great Lakes and are an integral part and indication of ecosystem 
quality;  
WHEREAS, fishery interests must organize to increase their effectiveness if they are to 
achieve a competitive position in relation to other user groups;  
WHEREAS, to most effectively manage the fishery resources of the Great Lakes there 
must be cooperation among the jurisdictions with authority for resource management 
because effective management calls for greater capability than any single state, province 
of nation ca provide;  
WHEREAS, only through cooperation can the mechanisms for protecting, rehabilitating 
and wisely using our fishery resources be strengthened;  
WHEREAS, through the encouragement of its cooperators, the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission accepted the challenge of sponsoring development of a Joint Strategic Plan 
for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries;  
WHEREAS, the Fishery Commission provided the forum in which those agencies with 
mandated responsibility for the welfare of the Great Lakes fishery resource could develop 
the Plan;  
WHEREAS, the Fishery Commission encouraged the Parties in their endeavors and 
shepherded the developers= efforts through the rewarding process in which a Plan was 
completed; and  
WHEREAS, the Fishery Commission believes that the Plan provides a design for action 
and a framework within which all fishery interests can work to improve the fishery 
resource and its management;  
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission at its 
meeting in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada on 17 June 1981, that it endorses the Joint Strategic 
Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, that it pledges support to the Parties in 
their efforts to implement the Plan, and that it will carry out its responsibilities specified 
in the plan to the best of its ability. 
ATTEST 
Chairman 







The following are working definitions for the purpose of implementing A Joint Strategic 
Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries*: 
Community: any assemblage of biota that functions as a unit through metabolic 
transformations 
Conservation: to avoid wasteful or destructive uses of natural resources  
maintenance of the value of the resource and its inherent benefits 
wise management 
Fishery resources: fish stock recognized by man to be of current or potential value and 
that man can use for his benefit or gain 
Goal: statement of intent to achieve a desired result which specifies societal benefits 
Impaired: reduced ability to function as a unit 
Issue: a public concern which impedes achievement of the goal 
Objective: a measurable result to be achieved 
Party: an agency that has ratified the Plan 
Rehabilitate: to secure a desirable fish community which is self-sustaining, diverse and 
resilient to a prescribed level of stress 
Exotic fish: a species non-indigenous to the Great Lakes (example: sea lamprey, alewife, 
smelt, brown trout, rainbow trout, splake) 
Secure: to put beyond hazard of losing; to achieve and maintain 
Stock: the part of the fish population which is under consideration from the point of view 
of actual or potential utilization (by more than one agency stocks of concern) 
Strategy: a long-term broad scale (whole system) course of action essential to the 





DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF CONSENSUS 
As the Aconsensus@ process is critical to this Plan, it is imperative that all Parties 
operate under a singular concept and definition. 
Webster=s dictionary defines consensus in the following way: 
1. harmony, cooperation or sympathy, especially in different parts of an organism; group 
solidarity in sentiment and belief. 
2. general agreement; collective opinion; the judgment arrived at by most of those 
concerned; to be in harmony or accord, especially in opinion, statement or sentiment; to 
express a willingness as to accept a proposition or carry out a particular action. 
The Encyclopedia Americana identifies three forms of consensus. The definition of 
Aemergent consensus@ seems particularly relevant to the Joint Strategic Plan. 
AEmergent consensus results from the crystallization of opinion after all points of review 
have been heard in the >market place of ideas=.@Y In theory, Aeach individual weighs 
the evidence and then draws a rational conclusion. The accumulation of judgment 
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constitutes public opinion. If the emergent majority is forceful enough, the minority 
adopts its view and the result is consensus.@ 
The Working Group believes this is how the Aconsensus@ process should work at the 
lake committee level in A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries. 
For further clarification, we offer the following examples. 
1.Q. How do you know you have consensus?  
A. When no party to the negotiation objects to the opinion. 
2.Q. How do you ensure adherence to the consensus decisions?  
A. You cannot; however, you can provide inducements to adherence by: a) having the 
consensus formalized through the signing of a public document by a chief executive 
officer; b) the specter of public revelation. 
3.Q. What happens if a consensus decision cannot be achieved?  
A. The problem will be taken to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission for mediation or 
arbitration (non-binding) at the request of one or more of the parties in the dispute at the 






Fishery Management Agencies (FMA)  
develop measurements of contributions of Great Lakes Fisheries to society initially  
obtain public input as necessary 
develop plans for achieving lake management objectives initially 
manage fisheries to achieve lake objectives continually 
submit proposed policies, plans, and management decisions to appropriate 
LCs before implementation annually 




make negotiated decisions a matter of record as necessary 
provide fishery data to other agencies on request  as necessary 
work together to develop compatible, automated information systems on 
Great Lakes fisheries data continually 
make annual reports to LCs annually 
 
Council of Great Lakes Fishery Agencies 
ensure mutual accountability of the Parties continuously
ensure accountability for the implementation and periodic review of the 
Plan continuously
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provide guidance and support to the Plan's institutional arrangements continuously
ensure timely and effective information exchange between law 
enforcement and fishery managers as necessary 
ensure that environmental objectives are articulated and reciprocal 
strategies with environmental agencies are developed as necessary 
provide for non-Party participation by Environment Canada, U.S. 




inform and educate on a basin-wide perspective, including the development 
and implementation of a strategic communications framework that details 




define objectives for the structure of each of the Great Lakes fish 
communities and develop means of measuring the progress towards 
achievement 
as necessary 
negotiate "consensus" decisions on those agency proposals which might 
influence another agency's interests as necessary 
identify environmental issues interfering with achievement of their fishery 
objectives as necessary 
make recommendations to the agencies and the GLFC as necessary 
prepare annual reports summarizing agency successes and failures annually 
prepare state-of-the-lake report quintennially
handle issues affecting more than one lake through Council of Lake 
Committees as necessary 
 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) 
facilitates conflict resolution when consensus cannot be achieved as necessary 
represents fishery interests to appropriate bodies continually
works with FMAs to develop means of predicting the effects of fisheries and 
environmental decisions  continually
submits an annual report on status of Great Lakes fisheries including 
recommendations on needs annually 
maintains Habitat Advisory Board to work with LCs (and environmental 
agencies, etc. as necessary) to formulate environmental objectives 
compatible with LCs fishery objectives 
continually
refers environmental issues to the HAB as needed 
maintains management committees including Lake Committees, Council of continually
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Affirmation of Agency Consensus for 1997 Revisions 
WHEREAS the commitment to interjurisdictional coordinated fishery management based 
upon an ecosystem approach is necessary to protect and enhance Great Lakes Fishery 
resources; and 
WHEREAS agencies with Great Lakes fishery management responsibilities adopted a 
Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries [the Plan] in 1981 and 
revised it in 1986; and 
WHEREAS in 1996 the agencies agreed to undertake a review of their commitment and 
performance in implementing the Plan with the goal of updating strategic procedures to 
meet the Plan=s promise in meeting today=s challenges, and authorized a Review 
Steering Committee to facilitate this review and, where appropriate, to recommend 
revisions to the Plan; and 
WHEREAS after thorough review through a survey, a workshop and written comments 
from the agencies and their personnel and from other agencies and individuals, the 
Review Steering Committee has recommended the 1997 Proposed Revisions to the Plan. 
THE UNDERSIGNED, on behalf of their agencies, hereby: 
1. Reaffirm their agencies= commitments made in the Memorandum of Acceptance of a 
Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries [17 June 1981]; 
2. Affirm their agencies= consensus to adopt the 1997 Proposed Revisions to the Plan; 
and 
3. Affirm their agencies= intent that the June 1997 Plan is effective immediately and 
supersedes previous versions of the Plan. 
CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
CHIPPEWA/OTTAWA TREATY FISHERY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY 
BY__________________________________ ATTEST s/  
_______________________________________ ITS__________________________________ s/ (TITLE) 
GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH AND WILDLIFE COMMISSION 
BY_________________________________ ATTEST s/  
_____________________________________ ____________________________________ s/ (TITLE) 
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE)  
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE 
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ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) ONTARIO MINISTRY OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
PENNSYLVANIA FISH COMMISSION 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 
ITS __________________________________(TITLE) 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ATTEST BY __________________________________s/ _____________________________________s/ 





RESOLUTION BY GREAT LAKES FISHERY 
COMMISSION 
TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF A GREAT LAKES 
FISHERIES  
AS REVISED IN 1997 
WHEREAS the 1955 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries directs the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission to study issues, publish, and advise on measures relative to fish 
stocks of common concern; and 
WHEREAS the Convention and related enabling legislation encourage partnerships in 
furtherance of the Convention; and 
WHEREAS in 1981 the Commission endorsed the Joint Strategic Plan for management 
of Great Lakes Fisheries, pledged its support to the Parties in their efforts to implement 
the Plan, and committed to carry out its responsibilities specified in the Plan to the best of 
its ability; and 
WHEREAS the Commission reaffirmed its commitment to the intent, processes, and goal 
stated in the Plan, and to the partnerships required for its successful achievement, in the 
Strategic Vision of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission for the Decade of the 1990s; and 
WHEREAS the Parties unanimously adopted 1997 Proposed Revisions to the Plan and so 
amended the Plan; 
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission during its 
meeting in Ottawa, Canada on 10 June 1997 that it endorses the Joint Strategic Plan or 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries as amended in 1997, that it pledges its support to 
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the Parties in their efforts to implement the Plan, and that it will carry out its 
responsibilities specified in the Plan to the best of its ability. 
BY_______________________________________ s/ Charles C. Krueger ATTEST 
_______________________________ 
ITS_______________________________________ s/ F.W.H. Beamish (TITLE)  
 
Leaders of state, provincial, tribal and federal agencies with responsibility for Great 
Lakes fishery resources directed the establishment of the Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries. For additional copies of this document, copies of 
a public information brochure about the Plan, or specific information on Great Lakes 
fisheries write to the following agencies: 
 
Fishery Management Agencies 
Chairman Chippewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority  
186 Three Mile Road  
Sault Ste. Marie, MI 49783  
Executive Administrator  
Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission  
P.O. Box 9 Odanah, WI 54861  
Chief, Div. of Fish and Wildlife Resources  
Illinois Dept. of Conservation  
Lincoln Tower Plaza  
524 S. Second Street Springfield, IL 62701  
Chief of Fisheries  
Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources  
402 W. Washington, rm. W-273  
Indianapolis, IN 46204  
Chief, Fisheries Division  
Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources  
Box 30028 Lansing, MI 48909  
Chief of Fisheries  
Minnesota Dept. of Natural Resources  
500 Lafayette Rd., Box 12 St. Paul, MN 55155  
Chief, Bureau of Fisheries  
New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation  
50 Wolf Rd., Rm. 518  
Albany, NY 12233  
Head, Fish Section  
Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources  
1840 Belcher Dr., G. 3  
Columbus, OH 43224  
Director, Fisheries Branch  
Ministry of Natural Resources  
Box 7000  
Peterborough, ON K9J 6X2  
Chief, Fisheries Division  
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Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission  
450 Robinson Lane  
Bellefonte, PA 16823  
Director, Bureau of Fish Management  
Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Resources  
P.O. Box 7921  
Madison, WI 53707  
 
Federal Agencies 
Director General, Central Region  
Canada Dept. of Fisheries and Oceans  
501 University Crescent  
Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N6  
Regional Administrator, Northeast Region  
National Marine Fisheries Service  
1 Blackburn Drive  
Gloucester, MA 01930  
Director, Region 3  
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service  
Federal Building,  
Fort Snelling Twin Cities, MN 55111  
Director, Region 5  
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service  
300 Westgate Center Drive  
Hadley, MA 01035  
 
For general information contact: 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission  
2100 Commonwealth Blvd., Suite 209  
Ann Arbor, MI 48105-1563  
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Appendix D: Commission Management & Control of Sea 
Lamprey    
 
The Convention directs the commission to coordinate and implement effective 
research, conservation, and management programs for the Great Lakes ecosystem.  
Article IV of the Convention dictates the commission’s major responsibilities as: 
  
(a) to formulate a research program or programs designed to determine the need for 
measures to make possible the maximum sustained productivity of any stock of 
fish in the Convention Area which, in the opinion of the commission, is of common 
concern to the fisheries of the United States of America and Canada and to 
determine what  measures are best adapted for such purpose; 
(b) to coordinate research made pursuant to such programs and, if necessary, to 
undertake such research itself, 
(c) to recommend appropriate measures to the Contracting Parties on the basis of the 
findings of such research programs; 
(d) to formulate and implement a comprehensive program for the purpose of 
eradicating or minimizing the sea lamprey populations in the Convention Area; 
and, 
(e) to publish or authorize the publications of scientific and other information 
obtained by the Commission in the performance of its duties73 
 
To accomplish its goals and address these responsibilities, the commission 
employs a variety of research programs and sea lamprey management techniques.  
 
Science Programs  
Under the Convention (Appendix A) article IV, section a and b, the commission is 
charged with formulating research needs and to undertake such research as necessary.   
The research that is conducted under the commission’s research programs are done by 
researchers from a variety of institutions including University of Michigan, University of 
Guelph, University of Waterloo, Michigan State University, and The Ohio State 
University.  Two research programs are managed by the commission: the fishery research 
program and the sea lamprey research program.  The fishery research program conducts 
research and develops recommendations for achieving a healthy Great Lakes ecosystem 
through ecological and social sciences.74  The sea lamprey research program is designed 
to provide the information needed to fully implement integrated management of sea 
lampreys, as well as develop new effective strategies for their control.  The sea lamprey 
control program focuses on the biological, ecological, and management-related research 
on sea lamprey and their effects on fish communities and the fisheries.75    
 
Fishery Research Program 
 The Board of Technical Experts (BOTE) committee oversees the Fishery 
Research Program, ensuring the information needed to achieve a healthy ecosystem, 
through appropriate research, is undertaken.  Research priorities under the Fishery 
Research Program are identified by the lake committees, the Council of Lake Committees 
and Great Lakes Fish Health Committee.  
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 The Fishery Research Program supports projects under broad themes that describe 
topics important to achieving Great Lakes ecosystem health.  The research program’s 
theme areas identify key research questions and hypotheses that can become the focus of 
specific projects.  The development for these areas is provided by the core group of 
BOTE and members-at-large.  
 
Sea Lamprey Research Program: 
The Sea Lamprey Research Program is overseen by the Sea Lamprey Research 
Board.  The purpose of the program is to conduct research to promote the development of 
innovative and progressive ideas about sea lamprey population control.  The committee 
overseeing the research also ensures its dissemination at their bi-annual meetings and 
coordinates the transfer of the science to the management of sea lamprey.  Research 
under this program strives to develop new techniques that will make sea lamprey control 
more effective and efficient – thus reducing lamprey populations to historic lows.  One 
example of the research taking place under the commission’s sea lamprey research 
program, and are in the field study phase, are pheromones. 
 
Pheromone studies:  
Studies being conducted through partnerships with researchers at various 
academic institutions such as Michigan State University in Lansing, MI, are conducting 
seminal studies about pheromones.  Pheromones are a chemical substance released by 
animals and fish to signal each other.  Certain pheromones communicate different 
messages; in one study, sea lamprey pheromones released by larval lampreys living in 
streams, signal parasitic adults living in the lakes, that the stream is suitable for 
spawning.  Another pheromone being studied is that of fully mature males signaling their 
sexual receptiveness to females.  Pheromones are seen as a potentially powerful new tool 
in the fight against sea lamprey; researchers and managers are currently synthesizing the 
pheromones to attract spawning adults into streams unsuitable for spawning; the sex 
pheromone could potentially be used to interfere with mate selection once adults are in 
streams.   
 
Sea Lamprey Management/Control 
The main charge of the commission is to suppress sea lamprey populations in a 
quest for rehabilitating the fishery stocks in the Great Lakes for the commercial and 
recreational fisheries.  The commission works in cooperation and in partnership with the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to undertake sea lamprey control.  The program institutes 
several techniques in an effort known as “integrated sea lamprey management.”76  
Components of this effort include sea lamprey assessment, lampricide control, sea 
lamprey barriers, sea lamprey traps and the sterile-male-release-technique.  Under the 
commission’s sea lamprey control program, lamprey assessment and lampricide control 
are components.  Under the alternative sea lamprey control program, barriers, traps and 





Sea Lamprey Assessment 
Though not a program in itself, it is important to point out that the commission 
institutes a comprehensive assessment program to understand the ecology and population 
dynamics of sea lampreys77 and their populations.  The commission collects quantitative 
sea lamprey information to track long term trends in lamprey populations.  This 
assessment program allows the commission to decide which streams, using which 
methods, to apply control measures.  These assessments are also helpful and necessary in 
monitoring and gauging the effectiveness of the commission’s control techniques, and to 
identify alternative means to control lamprey. 
 Sea lamprey assessment efforts focus on all of the stages of the sea lamprey’s life 
cycle; from their larval stage in the streams, to their parasitic and spawning phases.78  
Depending on the life stage being assessed, biologists from cooperating agencies go into 
the field using a variety of tools and methods, including backpack electro-fisher, to assess 
larval sea lampreys in shallow stream waters; charter boat and commercial fisherman 
provide monitoring agencies with data on parasitic-phase sea lampreys in the open waters 
of the Great Lakes; and, mechanical traps to catch spawning sea lamprey in select 
streams, data that provides accurate measurements of lake-wide sea lamprey populations.  
Using high-technological computer-based tools, coupled with the collected assessment 
data, the commission develops models that forecast larval and adult sea lamprey 
populations and develop strategies for sea lamprey control.79 
 
Sea lamprey control 
Implementation of the commission’s sea lamprey control programs is done by the 
US Fish and Wildlife Service and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada.  
These agencies are responsible for the application of TFM (3-triflouromethyl-4-
nitrophenol), the chemical designed specifically for killing sea lamprey larvae in streams.  
The commission also works with the Army Corps of Engineers, developing part of the 
alternative sea lamprey program that uses technologies that move away from chemical 
use and rely on physical barriers.  The Army Corps of Engineers establishes low-head or 
adjustable barriers that prohibit lamprey from reaching spawning habitat up stream. 
The purpose of the Commission is to suppress or eradicate sea lamprey 
populations so that the Great Lakes can return to previously perceived healthy aquatic 
ecosystem.  The program’s focus on sea lamprey eradication, and later on sea lamprey 
population mitigation and control, led to scientific studies to find a mechanism that would 
kill sea lampreys.  During the 1950s, under the direction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, scientists tested almost 6,000 compounds in hopes of identifying one that would 
be specific to sea lamprey.80  In 1958, TFM was discovered as a compound effective in 
controlling sea lampreys without significantly impacting other species.81  
Because sea lampreys spawn by migrating up streams, it allows the commission 
to have a target area of treatment.  Sea lamprey larvae live in Great Lakes tributaries and 
streams for three to six years before transforming into a parasitic adult and migrating into 
the lakes to begin feeding on fish.  For this reason, TFM is applied to streams where 
larval sea lampreys are found.  Close to 175 Great Lakes streams are treated at regular 
intervals to kill larvae;82 and depending on abundance, rate of growth and the age of the 
populations, tributaries are treated between three to ten year intervals.83  Although TFM 
has proven to be a successful tool, the cost of the chemicals, as well as the public’s 
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reluctance and skepticism about chemicals, is high.  Therefore the commission has been 
seeking alternative methods of control with the goal of reducing chemical treatments in 
the Great Lakes region. 
 
Alternative sea lamprey control 
In the 1990s, the commission began developing alternative control technologies 
with the objective of achieving a 50% reduction in lampricide application, even though 
lampricides have proven to be remarkably successful.84  Extensive testing into 
environmental safety on TFM and another lampricide (Bayluscide) that the commission 
uses, found them to have no long-term, detrimental effects to the ecosystem or human 
health.85  Public apprehension, however, about pesticides and escalating costs of 
lampricides, as well as finding more efficient and effective methods of controlling 
lamprey, has compelled the commission to find alternative technologies for sea lamprey 
control.86  With the goal of reducing lampricide use, the commission has focused on 
alternatives to chemical controls.  The overall reduction in TFM to date has been 30%, 
short of the commission’s proposed 50% reduction goal.  Nevertheless, the commission 
has found that the reduction of the additional 20% to reach the goal will be difficult, 
because a further reduction in TFM use would risk sea lamprey control effectiveness 
within the Great Lakes.  It is, therefore, the commission’s goal to expand, develop and 
implement alternative mechanisms of control to those streams that would have been 
treated with TFM to obtain the same control results.   
 Barriers: Physically blocking the sea lamprey from entering their spawning 
grounds is an effective manner to reduce sea lamprey populations, as well as reducing the 
use of lampricides either completely or in part.   
Some negative aspects are related to physical barriers in streams.  Most structures 
in the past have been permanent, and although prohibiting the passage of sea lamprey, 
also prohibited the passage of native fish.  The stream dynamics and ecosystem change 
also took place, as pools form both above and below fixed structures altering native free 
flowing ecosystems.  New technologies are being developed however to address these 
factors, including new types of barriers that incorporate state-of-the-art fish passage 
devices that allow passage of native fish but capture or repel sea lamprey. 
 Low-head barrier dams are now the most common on the Great Lakes tributaries.  
These structures create a low drop (generally about two feet) that does not allow sea 
lamprey to proceed upstream.  Because lampreys use their suction mouth to migrate 
upstream by attaching onto the substrate or structures, most low-head barriers are 
equipped with a lip to prevent this.  Jumping pools are also included with these structures 
to allow migratory salmonids and other jumping fish to pass over the structure.  Most 
low-head barriers are now equipped with vertical slots or fish passages that allow non-
jumping fish to pass but not the poor-swimming sea lamprey. 
 Adjustable-crest barriers are similar to fixed low-head barrier dams but are 
improved by their ability to rise and fall using inflatable air bladders.  This less intrusive 
design allows the stream to keep its free-flowing dynamics, and thus free fish passage, 
most of the year.  During spawning season, the adjustable-crest is raised to prevent sea 
lamprey from passing.  These adjustable-crest barriers are inflated to heights dictated by 
stream flow, and adjust to minimize alteration of the stream flow.  Similar to the fixed 
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low-head barrier, these barriers have jumping pools to allow jumping fish passage and are 
usually outfitted with other fish passage mechanism for non-jumping fish. 
 Electrical barriers were some of the first barriers used in the Great Lakes in the 
early 1950s.  Using alternating current (AC), the barriers were often ineffective due to 
flooding of the streams or power outages.  New barriers are being experimented with 
using direct current (DC).  These barriers, built into the stream bed, do not alter the 
stream flow and deter fish and sea lamprey into fish passage/sea lamprey traps near the 
side of the stream, allowing fish passage and capturing lampreys.  These barriers, like the 
adjustable-crest, are used only in the spawning season, allowing free fish passage the 
remainder of the year.    
Sterile-male-release 
 In 1991, biologists began experiments to determine whether sea lamprey 
sterilization could be an effective control mechanism to control sea lamprey populations 
in the Great Lakes.  Biologists hypothesize that sterilized males lampreys would compete 
with fertile males for females during spawning, thus reducing the number of eggs 
fertilized.  This technique has been successfully used around the world for reducing 
insect populations.87   
This method requires that lampreys are caught.  To do this, lamprey traps are 
established in a number of strategic locations throughout the Great Lakes region.  Many 
of these traps are in association with the previously mentioned barriers; others are placed 
in stream flow regimes that attract lampreys, and which have structures to suit traps, these 
include power stations or other private facilities.  Annually, the traps capture 
approximately 25,000 male sea lampreys.88  Once trapped, the sea lampreys are 
transported to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Hammond Bay Biological 
Station in the Northern lower-peninsula of Michigan.  Here they are sterilized and 
monitored through a program implemented by the USGS.  All of the lampreys caught, 
sterilized, and released are spawners (past their parasitic phase and not a threat to fish).  
The goal of this program is to increase the ratio of sterile to fertile males, thus creating an 
environment where sterilized males out-compete the fertile males mating with females; 
the result is nests of infertile lamprey eggs and a reduction of sea lampreys. 
Trapping  
Traps are designed to capture lampreys as they migrate upstream to spawn.  As 
mentioned previously, the traps are often associated with barriers, though there are traps 
stationed at utility companies and other private structures.  The male lampreys are used 




Appendix E: Federal and State Trust Funds 
 
These two trust fund mechanisms were brought to our attention during this study, 
both seemingly viable options to consider for long-term funding of an organization such 
as the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.  Among further investigation, however, we 
found that these trust funds are inadequate on a variety of levels, and can be considered 
no more stable or reliable than annual appropriations. 
Bauer and Probst, in their analysis of long term funding solutions, examine both 
state and federal trust funds and have assessed some of their weaknesses.  For the purpose 
of establishing a reliable, long-term funding mechanism, both the state and federal trust 
funds fail at meeting the criteria for an organization like the commission, looking for a 
perpetual source of funding.  
 
The Federal Trust Fund 
The federal budget of the United States includes more than 150 trust funds, the 
second major account group in the federal budget and amounting to one third of total 
spending.89  “Federal trust funds are created for specific and usually long-term purposes 
and have receipts earmarked for those purposes, as defined by specific legislation or trust 
agreements.”90  Federal trust funds, however, do not work in a similar fashion as private 
trust funds.  Bauer and Probst best describe a federal trust as being a record-keeping 
device rather than actual money put away (banked) for use.  They go on to say that, by 
law, any surplus “of a federal trust fund must usually be invested into U.S. Treasury 
securities,” or rather, “that a [federal] trust fund’s ‘balance’ is actually the debt that the 
Treasury owes that fund—debt on which the Treasury must pay the fund interest.”91  This 
turns out to be debt, Bauer and Probst explain, and is a government commitment, or 
obligation to pay; it is not cash or liquid assets and represents “an intra-governmental 
IOU.”92  The Federal Trust fund is vastly different from a private trust fund in that they 
are not pension funds and do not consist of real economic assets that can be drawn down 
in the future.  Instead, they are claims on the Treasury that, when redeemed, will have to 
be financed by raising taxes, borrowing from the public, or reducing benefits or other 
expenditures.  The existence of large trust fund balances, therefore, does not, by itself, 
have any impact on the Government’s ability to pay benefits.”93 
Finally, the federal trust fund is not a suitable, stable mechanism appropriate for 
long-term funding.  The federal government does not have a lawful duty to the 
beneficiaries (public); the government is not bound by any trust agreement.  Therefore, 
the government can unilaterally change the terms of a trust fund’s administration (both its 
revenues and its expenditures) by passing new legislation.  The assets of a federal trust 
(as mentioned above, consisting of only claims on the Treasury) are both owned and 
managed by the government (the trustee), “so that the benefits and burdens of ownership 
are not legally separated, as they are with a private trust fund.”94  What this means is the 
funds of a federal trust fund can be re-appropriated at anytime, leaving funding at the 
mercy of political agendas and the economic climate, similar to the annual appropriations 
process. 
Capital from a federal trust fund is controlled directly by the government; the 
government owns the assets and earnings of the trust fund and it can unilaterally raise or 
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lower future trust fund collections and payments, or change the purpose for which the 
collections are used, by changing existing law.95 
 
The State Trust Fund 
Another funding mechanism that we considered during this research was the state 
trust fund.  State trust funds can be financed by federal appropriations, but the power lies 
within the state to appropriate funds from the trust.  Hence, the state can unilaterally 
(similar to the federal trust fund) reallocate funds through legislation, which can 
potentially weaken the fund in times of economic uncertainty or political maneuverings.  
This would weaken the financial security of the fund over the long-term.  Additionally, 
with eight states in the Great Lakes basin, matters could potentially become confused 
about funding allocation; especially should there be a need to re-allocate funds within one 
state with monies earmarked for the commission’s common, bi-national fund.   
One weakness of state trust funds, similar to the federal trust fund, is that they are 
susceptible to legislative action on the state level, thus reducing their financial security.  This 
can be partially remedied through the state trust funds being created through a state 
constitutional provision; this would make it more difficult and time-consuming to change the 
structure and purpose of the trust fund compared to simply passing new legislation, which 
can be done when trust funds are established by law.  A trust written into a state constitution 
will likely serve its original purpose well into the future, assuring its purpose and financial 
security over the long term more so than were it established under state legislation.96 
 The state trust fund is seen as a great alternative by Bauer and Probst, a hybrid 
between a federal and private trust fund.  Should it be established properly (utilizing an 
aforementioned state constitution) it could serve as a secure long-term funding mechanism 
for environmental stewardship, it has the ability to be funded by federal appropriations (and 
is done so in many states), and due to the variations in state laws, it has degrees of ease in 
which they can be established in a state.  For some of the same reasons that this mechanism 
seems like a good resource for natural resource stewardship in the commission’s situation, it 
also makes it more difficult.  One major source of difficulty being that the Great Lakes 
fishery spans the jurisdiction of eight states, multiple local jurisdictions, two countries, and 
many tribes (who have rights to the resource under convention).   
It should be noted that Bauer and Probst’s favorable spin on the state trust fund, 
may have to do with their methodology of assessing its usefulness in the context of 
cleaning up contaminated sites and not a multi-jurisdictional, common-pool-resource.  
For these reasons, we only touched on the state trust fund and can only point to a few of 
the potential problems that would make this mechanism more difficult to work with than 
a private trust fund: 
 
□ What would the relationship be between the state which legally holds the state trust 
fund and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission? 
□ What would the relationship be between the state which harbors the state trust fund 
and the other states? 
□ The relationship between the source (federal government or private sources) that 
capitalizes the state trust fund and the state which harbors the trust fund, the other 
states, the tribes, and the commission? 
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The relationships between a state trust fund and the other stakeholders within the 
Great Lakes basin, and partners of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, would need to 
be worked out in great detail, and exceeds the scope of this paper.  The above concerns 
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